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NOTES
REAL PROPERTY-GIULIE7TI

V.

GIULIE7TI-PARTITION

BY

PRIVATE SALE ABSENT SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORITY
INTRODUCTION

"Partition proceedings can hardly be classed among topics for
enlivening discussion, text books say little about them and case
books less; they lack the dramatic elements present in crime and
tort."l Although partition as a subject matter may lack dramatic
elements, the circumstances from which it arises often reveal
Shakespearean themes of greed, treachery and hubris. In Giulietti
v. Giuiietti,2 the Connecticut Appellate Court was presented with
an unusual consolidation of claims for fraud, legal malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duty, dissolution of a closely held family corpo
ration, and partition of the land on which that corporation was con
ducting business. 3 The court affirmed the superior court's order
that the land in question be sold at private sale restricting the pur
chasers to those members of the Giulietti family who would have
owned the property legally as tenants in common, absent the fraud
and legal malpractice. 4
The Connecticut Superior Court derived its authority to order
a sale of the land from section 52-500 of the Connecticut General
Statutes. s However, section 52-500 does not explicitly authorize a
court of general jurisdiction to order a private sale;6 the statute of
fers only two modes of relief: partition in kind (actual physical divi
1. William H. Loyd, Partition, 67 V. PA. L. REv. 162, 162 (1919).
2. 784 A.2d 905 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
3. For purposes of this note, Giulietti will serve as a portal to a larger discussion
of the remedy of partition by sale and the authority of state courts to order partition by
private sale in the absence of explicit statutory mandate.
4. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 934-37.
5. Id. at 934.
6. See infra note 7 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500). See also Giulietti, 784
A.2d at 935 (stating that "[t]he language of § 52-500 itself is not helpful to a determina
tion of whether a private sale is authorized [because] ... must what types of 'sales' are
contemplated by the statute is not specified.").
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sion) or partition by sale. 7 On appeal, the defendant challenged the
court's authority to order a private, rather than public, sale as a
means of effectuating partition where not expressly authorized by
statute. 8
Whether a court of general jurisdiction has the authority to or
der a private sale in a partition proceeding in the absence of explicit
statutory language was an issue of first impression for the Connecti
cut Appellate Court. 9 This note will assess the court's analysis in
light of the history of partition and inherent powers of equity. Part
I addresses the facts presented in Giulietti, the superior court's
analysis in reaching a decision, and the appellate review. Part II
defines and develops partition as both an action and a remedy in
American jurisprudence. Part III of this note explores the history
of partition, the origins of which, predictably, are rooted in English
law. It examines the incorporation of English law, both common
and statutory, into American law, and the development of a distinct
common law tradition in equity. This historical dalliance will ex
pose the underlying principles of law that gave the Connecticut Ap
pellate Court adequate authority to confirm a judicial order of
partition by private sale. Part IV discusses the development of the
remedy of partition by sale, focusing on the early Connecticut case
law. Part V places the decision in Giulietti in the context of two
recent partition decisions by the Connecticut Supreme Court,
Delfino v. Vealencis lO and Fernandes v. Rodriguez,l1 to reveal that
although there was sufficient equitable authority inherent in an ac
tion for partition, as discussed in Part III, the Connecticut Appel
late Court was constrained by these prior decisions. Thus the
superior court was able to restrict its decision to the specific facts
presented in Giulietti by using parallel provisions in state probate
law. The decision in Giulietti permitting a superior court to order a
private sale was an equitable remedy intended to give effect to the
intent of the grantor in an intergenerational transfer,12 The deci
sion was carefully tied to the facts to prevent the expansion of the
remedy for partition and to limit courts' equitable powers in provid
7. "Any court of equitable jurisdiction, may upon the complaint of any person
interested, order the sale of any property real or personal, owned by two or more per
sons when, in the opinion of the court, a sale will better promote the interests of the
owners." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500(a) (1991).
8. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 934-37.
9. Id. at 935.
10. 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980).
11. 761 A.2d 1283 (Conn. 2000).
12. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936.
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ing a remedy.B In the absence of explicit statutory language grant
ing Connecticut superior courts with the power to order private
sales in partition actions, this remedy will not be available to peti
tioners seeking partition and courts will be hesitant to order this
remedy unless similar facts are presented.
I.

A.

GIULIETTI

v.

GIULIETTI

The Substantive Facts

John J. Giulietti owned a thirty-two acre parcel of land located
at 325 Kelly Road, Vernon, Connecticut, on which was located a
mobile home park incorporated as Vernon Village, Inc. The sole
shareholders of the corporation were John J. Giulietti (Mr. Giu
lietti) and his wife, Alma Giulietti.1 4 Mr. and Mrs. Giulietti had
four children, John L. Giulietti, James Giulietti, Joanne Giulietti
Hollis and Anita Giulietti Demoupolos.15 James worked as the
property manager of the mobile home park and was a full-time em
ployee of Vernon Village, Inc.1 6 He worked closely with Mr. Giu
lietti, who apparently "dislike[ d] paperwork and the legal aspects of
the business."I? These matters he left to his oldest son, John L.
Giulietti, a Connecticut attorney.18 Starting in 1981, Attorney Giu
lietti1 9 "handled all the legal matters for the family and the mobile
home park business."2o Anita and Joanne "lived out of state and
did not participate substantially in the operation of Vernon Village,
Inc."21 James served as president of Vernon Village, Inc. and At
torney Giulietti acted as secretary; Joanne served on the board of
13. The Connecticut Appellate Court's support for "a court's having discretion to
order a private sale" is circumscribed by the judicial preference for partition in kind and
such discretion would only be appropriate because "a private sale ... is closer in charac
ter to a partition in kind." Id. at 935-36.
14. Giulietti v. Giulietti, No. X03CV 980492096S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416,
at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1999).
15. Id.
16. Id. at *3.
17. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 928.
18. Attorney John L. Giulietti was admitted to the Connecticut Bar in 1972. Giu
lietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *2.
19. This note will follow the superior court's system of differentiating between
John J. Giulietti, father, and John L. Giulietti, son. John J. Giulietti, father, will be
referred to as "Mr. Giulietti" and John L. Giulietti, his son, will be referred to as "At
torney Giulietti." Id. at *2-3. The appellate court's opinion is consistent with the supe
rior court's opinion in this respect with the exception that "Attorney" is not capitalized
as a proper noun.
20. Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *3.
21. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 917.

128

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:125

directors at various points whereas Anita did not serve in any ca
pacity at any point. 22
In late 1990, Mr. Giulietti, on the advice of the family account
ant, instructed Attorney Giulietti to begin transferring property, in
cluding 325 Kelly Road and the assets of Vernon Village, Inc., in
annual increments to each of the four Giulietti children equally.23
Mr. Giulietti "envisioned that his sons would continue to earn sala
ries by running the mobile horne park and that otherwise the family
assets would be shared by the children equally."24 Attorney Giu
lietti took advantage of his father's trust and through a series of
fraudulent agreements, deeds, and conveyances reduced both of his
sisters' shares in the 325 Kelly Road property and in the corpora
tion. He thereby increased his own portion of both the land and the
corporation, and, to a lesser extent, that of James. 25
James was involved in Attorney Giulietti's scheme, having per
suaded their mother, Alma, to transfer her shares of Vernon Vil
lage, Inc. stock to Attorney Giulietti and himself.26 However, the
extent of James' involvement and the level to which he understood
the import of his actions are unclear in the recordP Eventually,
the relationship between Attorney Giulietti and James deteriorated
to the point where James refused to sign any more documents and,
acting in his capacity as president, terminated Attorney Giulietti's
employment with Vernon Village, Inc. 28
In what the superior court referred to as a "desperate effort to
maintain control,"29 Attorney Giulietti filed a conservatorship peti
tion to have his mother, Alma, declared incompetent to manage her
assets, which would have prevented her from using her own inde
pendent money to fund the inevitable and imminent lawsuit against
him.3D Although the probate court rejected the petition,31 this "did
22. Id.
23. The purpose was to avoid paying substantial estate taxes by transferring the
maximum gift amount allowable by law each year during his lifetime. Id.; Giulietti,
1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *4.
24. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 917.
25. Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *27-28. See also Giulietti, 784
A.2d at 919 n.8, 922 n.16.
26. Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *22.
27. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 921. The appellate court noted that James acted "per
haps believing that attorney Giulietti would arrange for an equal distribution of the
family assets." Id. at 921-22.
28. Id. at 921, 927. "Attorney Giulietti was successful in having his employment
reinstated." Id. at 922 n.17.
29. Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *27.
30. Id.
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cause Mr. Giulietti to finally realize that his son the lawyer had not
carried out his wishes. "32 Mr. and Mrs. Giulietti initiated an action
sounding in fraud and legal malpractice, "not from any desire for
vengeance or damages, but in order to attempt to effectuate Mr.
Giulietti's intent to distribute his land and business equally to his
children."33 James and Joanne brought the partition action
"seek[ing] a reformation of the deeds from Mr. Giulietti to his chil
dren such that each child obtains 25 % ownership in the 325 Kelly
Road property."34
B.

The Superior Court's Decision

In their complaint, James and Joanne requested that the supe
rior court order partition by private sale. 35 The superior court held
that, under section 52-495 of the Connecticut General Statutes, Jo
anne and James had an absolute right as tenants in common with
Attorney Giulietti and Anita to request partition of the property.36
The superior court determined that the physical attributes of the
property made it impracticable or inequitable to make partition in
kind and therefore ordered partition by sale under Connecticut
General Statute section 52-500. 37 The superior court found that a
private sale was "warranted in light of the circumstances"38 and or
dered that the 325 Kelly Road property be sold at private auction
where the only permissible bidders would be the four Giulietti chil
dren. 39 The circumstances warranting a private auction were the
Giulietti family's desire to continue operating Vernon Village and
to maintain family ownership of Vernon Village, Inc., and the fact
that the relationship between the land and the business was such
that the business would be placed in jeopardy were the land sold to
31. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 921.
32. Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *27.
33. [d. at *30.
34. [d. at *44. Anita was a named defendant in the partition action; however,
through direct communications with the superior court, she indicated that her interests
were in fact aligned with those of her siblings, James and Joanne. She declined to file as
a plaintiff out of fear "of the bullying and voluminous paperwork [her] ... brother,
John L. GiulieUi, would subject [her] to." Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 938 n.32.
35. Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *44.
36. [d. at *48-49. The appellate court stated that "by the plain language of §52
500, a consensus among the parties is not prerequisite to the court's order of a sale."
Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 937.
37. Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *50-52.
38. [d. at *52.
39. [d.
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a stranger. 40 As a further remedy, so as to prevent unjust enrich
ment of Attorney Giulietti, the superior court imposed a construc
tive trust on his share of the 325 Kelly Road property.41 Thus,
under the terms of the sale, the amount received for Attorney Giu
lietti's share was to be distributed equally between Joanne and
Anita to compensate them for loss of income during the period in
which they owned less than their fair share of the property.42
C.

The Appeal

In his appeal, Attorney Giulietti claimed that the trial court
acted improperly in ordering a private sale limited to his siblings
because the trial court was not authorized by section 52-500 of Con
necticut General Statutes to order a private sale. 43 He also claimed
that the court could not order a private sale over his objections
merely because the other three parties in interest had requested a
private sale. 44 The appellate court affirmed the superior court's rul
ing with respect to both issues. 45
On appeal, the standard of review applied by the appellate
court was "whether the [superior] court abused its discretion in or
dering a partition by sale."46 However, that review was plenary be
cause the superior court's decision relied on statutory
interpretation. 47 Following principles of statutory interpretation,
the appellate court "look[ ed] to the words of the statute itself, to
the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment,
to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its
relationship to existing legislation and common law principles gov
erning the same subject matter."48 The appellate court's treatment
of the language of section 52-50049 is brief because "must what
types of 'sales' are contemplated by the statute is not specified."50
According to the appellate court, the legislative history is no more
revealing because none is available. 51 This void forced the appel
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 937; Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *57.
Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3416, at *57.
Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 933.
Id.
Id. at 933, 937.
Id. at 934.
Id. (citing State v. Velasco, 751 A.2d 800, 807 (Conn. 2000)).
Id. at 935.
See supra note 7 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500(a)).
Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 935.
"Because of the early date of enactment, no legislative history is available."
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late court to look at parallel statutes authorizing probate courts to
order partition by sale,52 either public or private. 53
The appellate court noted that probate section 45a-16454 is
quite similar in structure and application to section 52-500. 55 This
similarity "authorize[d] the Superior Court to make an analogous
determination in response to a like request."56 Thus the court's re
liance on parallel authority "[was] appropriate given the facts in this
case,"57 primarily the "intergenerational transfer of family real
property near the end of the grantor's life. "58 In fact, the superior
court was constrained by the facts to reach a result consistent with
what a probate court might have ordered. 59 In addition, the supeGiulietti, 784 A.2d at 935. The Connecticut Supreme Court has, in the past, relied on
references in earlier opinions to the statute. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 761 A.2d
1283 (Conn. 2000). "In Connecticut, an act extending the power of our courts to order
a sale in partition proceedings was enacted in 1844." [d. at 1288. Some history of the
language of subsequent revisions of the 1844 Act can be gleaned from early case law.
See infra note 158 and accompanying text. But see Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936 n.31 (not
ing that the "[l]egislative history associated with later revisions is not substantive and
sheds no light on the issue").
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-164 (1991).
53. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-166(a):
The court of probate in ordering a sale under the provisions of sections 45a
164 to 45a-169, inclusive, ... shall direct whether the sale shall be public or
private. If a public sale is directed, the court shall direct the notice thereof
which shall be given. If a private sale is directed, the court may, if it appears to
be in the best interests of the estate, determine the price and the terms of the
sale ... , as it considers reasonable and advisable.
54. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-I64(a):
Upon the written application of the conservator of the estate of any person,
guardian of the estate of a minor, administrator or trustee appointed by the
court, including a trustee of a missing person, or the executor or trustee under
any will admitted to probate by the court, after public notice and other notice
which the court may order and after hearing, the court may authorize the sale
or mortgage of the whole or any part of ... any real property in this state of
such person, missing person, deceased person or trustee ..., if the court finds
it would be in the best interests of the parties in interest to grant the
application.
55. See supra note 7 (containing the language of section 52-500 of Connecticut
General Statutes).
56. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936. The similarity in structure and application also
makes the absence of language authorizing superior courts to order private sales more
obvious and hints at an intentional legislative silence. However, thanks to section 52
500's negligible legislative history, the issue was decided by the courts, specifically the
Connecticut Appellate Court. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 905. See supra note 51 and infra
note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of section 52-500).
57. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936.
58.

[d.

59. "The statute [section 45a-164(a)] is thus similar in structure to § 52-500, which
authorizes the Superior Court to make an analogous determination in response to a like
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rior court was bound by two relatively recent Connecticut Supreme
Court decisions concerning partition: Delfino v. Vealencis 60 reaf
firmed the Connecticut judiciary's commitment to partition in kind,
contradicting the more modern trend towards partition by sale;61
Fernandes v. Rodriguez 62 restricted the superior court's equitable
powers in partition, holding that the only remedies available were
those articulated by the legislature. Thus the marked absence of
language in section 52-500 explicitly authorizing superior courts to
order private sales was overshadowed by larger concerns about
consistency and equity.63 These decisions left very little room for
the superior court in Giulietti v. Giulietti to maneuver. However,
the narrowness of the decision, based on the specific facts presented
and the immediate parallel in probate court, is precisely why the
appellate court concluded that "the [lower] court ... had the au
thority pursuant to section 52-500 to order that 325 Kelly Road be
sold at a private auction rather than at a public sale."64
The second claim of Attorney Giulietti's appeal, that he had
not requested a private sale, challenges whether the second element
of section 52-SOD-that a sale would be in the best interests of the
parties-was met at trial. The appellate court cited the judicial pol
icy of favoring partition in kind over partition by sale; that policy is
"founded on the premise that a 'sale of one's property without his
consent is an extreme exercise of power warranted only in clear
request." Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936. Despite the permissive rather than mandatory
language, this statement reveals some concern for consistency in outcome based on
facts.
60. 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980).
61. "Even though most state statutes still give lip-service to a presumption of divi
sion-in-kind, a review of the cases reveals that the presumption is rarely honored ...."
Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking Glass: A View of Judicial Partition,
Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 764 (2000). "[State courts']
decisions demonstrate a marked preference for judicial sales despite the statutory pref
erence for partitions in kind." Candace Reid, Note, Partitions in Kind: A Preference
Without Favor, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 855, 856 (1986).
62. 761 A.2d 1283 (Conn. 2000).
63. "Section 52-500, though not specifically authorizing private sales, similarly
does not specifically restrict them." Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936. Although the appellate
court was conscious of that absence, it repeatedly cites the similarity in structure be
tween section 45a-164 and section 52-500 and the facts of the case as determinative of
the outcome. See, e.g., id. (noting "[w]e turn to legislation governing the same general
subject matter ... ;" "[t]he statute [section 45a-164] is thus similar in structure to § 52
500 ... ;" "an analogous determination in response to a like request ... ;" "in light of
the similarity between § 45a-164 and § 52-500 in structure and in application, particu
larly under the facts of this case").
64. Id.
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cases.' "65 Underlying that policy is the presumption that partition
in kind is in the best interests of the owners.66
Section 52-500 of the Connecticut General Statutes imposes
the presumption that partition in kind is preferred for all partition
actions. The party seeking partition by sale must prove that "parti
tion in kind [is] impracticable or inequitable; and the interests of
the owners would better be promoted by partition by sale. "67 Sec
tion 45a-164 permits probate courts to authorize the sale of real
property "if the court finds it would be for the best interests of the
parties in interest to grant the application. "68 The connection be
tween private sales and partition in kind is explicitly reinforced in
the probate statutes. Section 45a-166 states that "[t]he court of pro
bate ... shall direct whether the sale shall be public or private," and
"[i]f a private sale is directed, the court may, if it appears to be for
the best interests of the estate, determine the price and the terms of
the sale . . . ."69
Thus where partition in kind cannot be made, a private sale is
preferable to a public sale. " [A] private sale ... is closer in charac
ter to a partition in kind because it gives the current owners a better
chance of retaining their property."70 The appellate court accepted
the superior court's finding that the Giulietti family wished to retain
ownership and control of 325 Kelly Road and Vernon Village, Inc.
and determined that "at least three of the four siblings desired such
a sale."71 The Giulietti family's expressed desire to retain their land
was powerful evidence supporting the order of a private sale as "in
the best interests of all the parties involved."72 Thus the superior
court fully complied with "the policy disfavoring the forced sale of
family real property"73 by ordering a private sale and "properly de
65. Fernandes, 761 A.2d at 1288 (citing Ford v. Kirk, 41 Conn. 9, 12 (1874». See
also Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 935.
66. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 935-36 (citing Fernandes, 761 A.2d at 1288). Cf Ford, 41
Conn. at 12.
67. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 934 n.30.
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-I64(a) (1991).
69. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-166(a) (1991). This language has been interpreted as
mandatory by the Connecticut Supreme Court. "If the sale is to be private, the court
must also find that the price and terms of the sale are in the 'best interests of the es
tate.'" Satti v. Rago, 441 A.2d 615, 618 n.3 (Conn. 1982) (emphasis added).
70. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 935-36.
71. [d. at 936.
72. [d. at 936; Giulietti v. Giulietti, No. X03CV 980493096S, 1999 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 3416, at *51-52 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1999).
73. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936.
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termined that it had the authority pursuant to [section] 52-500."74
The superior court did not cite either the equitable nature of a
partition action or the power of a court in equity to provide an ap
propriate remedy not authorized by statute as sources of authority
for its decision to order a private sale.75 Having concluded that, "it
is within a trial court's discretion to order a partition by sale,"76 the
Connecticut Appellate Court stated that "a partition by sale, al
though a creature of statute, is an equitable action."77 However,
the appellate court did not link the trial court's exercise of discre
tion in ordering a private sale to the equitable nature of a partition
action. The appellate court cited principles of equity merely to dis
miss Attorney Giulietti's claim that a private sale would not bring a
sufficient price. 78 Thus, although the appellate court acknowledged
the action of partition, specifically partition by sale, as an equitable
action,79 it declined to use the wealth of authority, both historical
and modern, surrounding partition as both an action and a remedy
in equity to justify or substantiate its affirmation of the superior
court's order of a private sale. The Giulietti family presented a
cause of action for partition seeking equity and the facts of the Giu
lietti case warranted an equitable remedy.80 However, facts alone
do not dictate the extent and nature of a trial court's jurisdiction. 81
74. Id.
75. The superior court stated that its decision to order a private sale was "war
ranted in light of the circumstances" because "[a]1I parties have requested that the court
order the property [325 Kelly Road] to be sold at private sale" and "[t]he Giulietti
family wishes to continue to operate Vernon Village, and their family-controlled corpo
ration, Vernon Village, Inc.... operates a business on the land." Giulietti, 1999 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 3416, at *52.
76. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936 (citing Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 761 A.2d 1283, 1290
(Conn. 2000)).
77. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936 (citing Fernandes, 761 A.2d at 1289).
78. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936-37. This claim, according to the appellate court, was
unwarranted because "once the court has exercised its equitable jurisdiction by order
ing a partition by sale, it also has discretion to approve or reject the sale." Id. at 936
(citing Fernandes, 761 A.2d at 1290).
79. Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936.
80. Both the superior and appellate court opinions draw upon the unique facts
presented in order to justify the decision. Id. at 936-37; Giulietti, 1999 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 3416, at *49-52. The appellate court cited the facts that the family wanted to
retain ownership of the property at 325 Kelly Road and to continue operating Vernon
Village, Inc. in support of a private sale, which is "closer in character to a partition in
kind because it gives the current owners a better chance of retaining their property."
Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 936. This reliance on the facts may serve to restrict the effect of
the ruling on other cases where the facts are not as compelling.
81. See Giulietti, 784 A.2d at 938 (quoting 30A c.J.S. Equity § 81 (1992)) (estab
lishing that because the court assumed equitable jurisdiction over the matter, "the doc
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Giulietti v. Giulietti elucidates the question of whether there is suffi
cient authority in the body of law, both historical and modern, sur
rounding partition such that a trial court may, in the absence of
specific statutory authority, order a partition by private, rather than
public, sale in equity.

II.

PARTITION AS AN ACTION AND A REMEDY

The term "partition" is used to describe both the action and
the remedy available to any co-tenant who wishes to dissolve a co
tenancy relationship.82 It is defined as "the act or proceeding by
which co-owners of property cause it to be either divided into as
many shares as there are owners according to their interests
therein, or, if that cannot be equitably done, to be sold for the best
obtainable price and the proceeds distributed" among the co-own
ers according to their interests therein and thereby "severing the
unity of possession, so that the joint tenants may hold them in sev
eralty."83 Partition is necessary "to allow persons who own prop
erty in common to sever their interests so that each one may take
possession of, enjoy, and improve his separate estate at his own
pleasure and convenience ...."84
The right to partition may have initially been granted as a mat
ter of grace;85 however, it soon developed into a cognizable, abso
lute legal right. 86 The right to "partition yields to no consideration
of hardship, inconvenience or difficulty"87 with respect to actually
partitioning the land or its effect on the parties in interest. 88 Furtrine of retaining jurisdiction in order to completely adjust the controversy extends to
the granting of relief to a defendant or between codefendants.").
82. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1141 (7th ed. 1999).
83. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 1 (2003).
84. Mechling, 120 N.E. at 543. See also Peck, 157 N.E.2d at 260; Hurst, 574 P.2d
at 312 (noting "the purpose of the remedy of partition is to allow joint owners who
cannot get along with each other to sever their relationship as joint owners.").
85. Murphy v. Murphy, 175 N.E. 378, 379 (Ill. 1931); Hill v. Reno, 112 Ill. 154, 160
(1883) (asserting that the right of partition "has become a matter of right and not mere
grace.").
86. Cates v. Johnson, 19 So. 416, 417 (Ala. 1869) (labeling partition "a matter of
right."); Peck, 157 N.E.2d at 260 (calling the right to partition "imperative."); Murphy,
175 N.E. at 379; Hill, 112 Ill. at 160; Mercantile Bank v. Yeggy, No. 1-633/00-1524,2002
Iowa App. LEXIS 250, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2002) (recognizing the right of any
tenant in common, "at any time, [to] denounce the tenancy and demand his share in
severalty. ").
87. Peck, 157 N.E.2d at 260.
88. Cates, 19 So. at 417; Johnson v. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 509, 517 (1882); Peck, 157
N.E.2d at 260; Mechling, 120 N.E. at 543-44; Hill 112 Ill. at 160; Michael v. Sphier, 272
P. 902, 904 (Or. 1928) (citing FREEMAN, CO-TENANCY AND PARTITION § 433 (2d ed.
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thermore, the right of partition will be given effect over and despite
the objections of other co-owners.89 The right to partition may be
defeated only by a superior claim in equity where a court may dis
miss the petition for partition if it determines, in its discretion, that
it would not be in the best interests of the owners to alter or sever
their property interests via partition,90 or where partition would run
contrary to public policy.91
Courts developed numerous methods to give the right of parti
tion effect according to the facts and circumstances presented. Par
tition in kind means that lands held in common are physically
divided into shares and each owner receives a share proportional to
his interest in the land.92 Owelty partition, or payment of owelty, is
a modification of partition in kind developed by courts of equity to
equalize the shares through a payment of money, by the party re
ceiving the larger, disproportionate share, to the party receiving a
lesser share where the unique nature of the land prevents a more
equitable division. 93 Partition can also be made by granting each
party the right to use the land for a specified duration;94 however,
this remedy has fallen out of favor due to the obvious inconve
nience and potential inequities created. Partition by sale is the
more modern remedy, whereby a court may order that the land in
question be sold for the highest price obtainable and the proceeds
distributed to the parties according to their interests. 95 The histori
cal development of these various methods, from partition in kind to
1886)); Geis v. Vallazza, 207 A.2d 248, 252 (vt. 1965) (noting the law's willingness to
order a partition by sale despite the objections of either owner); 59A AM. JUR. 2D
Partition § 4 (2003). But see Mechling, 120 N.E. at 543-44.
89. Hill, 112 Ill. at 162; Geis, 207 A.2d at 251-52.
90. Peck, 157 N.E.2d at 260; Mechling, 120 N.E. at 543-44; Michael, 272 P. at 904
(citing FREEMAN, supra note 89, § 439). But see Long v. Long, 1 Watts. 265, 267 (Pa.
1883) (affirming private agreement of voluntary partition made when parties were mi
nors, but which they performed after reaching the age of majority); 4 HERBERT T. TIF
FANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Co-Ownership § 475, at 312-15 (3d ed. 1975)
(asserting that "the infancy of one or more of his co-tenants will not be permitted to
suspend an adult co-tenant's right to enforce partition is well-settled, notwithstanding
•
the solicitude of the courts for the welfare of minors").
91. Peck, 157 N.E.2d at 260.
92. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 1 (2003).
93. Hill, 112 Ill. at 167 (defining owelty as "pecuniary compensation"); Rothert v.
Rothert, 441 N.E.2d 179, 181-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 1
(2003); 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, Partition § 50.07[4][c], at
50-49 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2002).
94. See Hanson v. Willard, 12 Me. 142, 147-48 (1835) (establishing that temporal
division is an ancient doctrine recognized as law); Loyd, supra note 1, at 167.
95. Michael, 272 P. at 902; 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 1 (2003).
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partition by sale, highlights the fact that partition is an unusual rem
edy within the realm of property law because it alters the legal rela
tionship between each owner and the land itself and, in the case of
sale, it severs legal ownership altogether. 96
III.
A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PARTITION

English Law

In England, there was no partition action at law or in equity for
joint tenants or tenants in common until the mid-sixteenth cen
tury.97 Co-tenants of land who no longer agreed about the manage
ment or disposition of the land were forced to remain co-tenants or
to reach a voluntary agreement to dissolve the co-tenancy relation
ship.98 Only coparceners were allowed to seek judicial intervention
through courts of chancery.99 A court of chancery could order par
tition in kind 100 or owelty partition.1 01 Coparceners were granted
this privilege because they inherited the land and, therefore, had no
choice as to whether they wanted to share ownership of the land
with another or with the particular other that also inherited an in
terest. 102 During the reign of Henry VIII,lo3 the right to partition
96. "Partition is the right to a severance, when there is a rightful unity of title and
possession." 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 3 (2003).
97. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY Partition § 6.21, at 94-95 (1952); 7 POWELL,
supra note 94, § 50.07[1], at 50-37 & § 50.09, at 50-54; 4 TIFFANY, supra note 91, § 473,
at 307. See also Pierce v. Pierce, 123 N.E.2d 511, 512 (Ill. 1954) (providing historical
background on partition).
98. Loyd, supra note 1, at 168.
99. Hill v. Reno, 112 Ill. 154, 159 (1883); O'Brien v. Mahoney, 60 N.E. 493, 494
(Mass. 1901).
100. Occasionally, where actual physical division could not be accomplished, tem
poral division was granted, which meant that one heir would use the property for a
period of time and then the other for an equal period. Loyd, supra note 1, at 167. See
also Morrill v. Morrill, 5 N.H. 134, 135 (1830) (validating temporal partition as a rem
edy); Hanson v. Willard, 12 Me. 142, 148 (1835). But see Wood v. Little, 35 Me. 107, 109
(1853) (holding that "[ d]ivision by time is not authorized by statute" and "is not a prac
ticable or substantial partition. ").
101. Loyd, supra note 1, at 174.
102. See Loyd, supra note 1, at 165 (noting that where "the estate of the noble
was indivisible so also was that of the villein" and that "it was in the interest of the lord
of the manor that the holding of the villein remain undivided with a single heir answera
ble for the customary services."). See also Reid, supra note 61, at 858 n.15 (querying
whether the right was restricted to coparceners so as not to allow those who entered
into voluntary legal arrangements to use the law to terminate that relationship). But
see Johnson v. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 509, 517 (1882) (asserting that the right to partition
was so absolute that "[n]o person can be compelled to remain the owner with another
of real estate, not even if he become such by his own act ...."). Interestingly, modern
law allows parties to sign anti-alienation agreements, which are contractual promises
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was extended to joint tenants and tenants in common. I04 Any party
in interest could compel division of the common property by writ of
partition. lOS
This right to demand partition was held absolute and applied
to all parties in interest. This extension of the right to partition
established the writ of partition as an action at law. I06 However,
shortly after the enactment of the Act of Henry VIII,107 "the court
of chancery began to take jurisdiction of suits for partition. "108 In
1833, the writ of partition was abolished and partition could be
sought only through a bill in equity.109 Chancery courts were lim
ited to the same remedies, partition in kind and payment of
oweltyllO that they had applied to coparceners prior to the Act of
Henry VIILIII Limited to these remedies, but forced to provide a
remedy by the absolute nature of the right to demand partition,
courts often reached ridiculous results.1 12 Finally in 1868, the Parti
tion Act l13 granted chancery courts, in their discretion, the author
ity to order the land sold upon the request of any owner where
partition in kind was not in his or her best interest. 114

not to seek judicial partition. 59A AM. JUR. 20 Partition § 58 (2003); 68 C.J.S. Partition
§ 11; 3 TIFFANY, supra note 91, § 474, at 309-10.
103. The reign of Henry VIII lasted from 1509 until 1547. STANDARD DIcnONARY OF FACTS 80-2 (1923).
104. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1539) (Eng.).
105. Loyd, supra note 1, at 168-69.
106. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21, at 94; 4 TIFFANY,
supra note 91, § 473, at 307; John G. Casagrande, Jr., Note, Acquiring Property
Through Forced Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. REV. 755, 758
(1985).
107. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1539) (Eng.).
108. 2 AMERICAN LAW Of PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21, at 94; Loyd, supra
note 1, at 172-73; 4 TIFFANY, supra note 91, § 473, at 307.
109. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27 (1691) (Eng.); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra
note 98, § 6.21, at 94-95; 4 TIFFANY, supra note 91, § 473, at 307.
110. JOHN V. ORTH, 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, Tenancies in Common
§ 32.08(b), at 88-89 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994); Loyd, supra note 1, at 173-74.
111. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1539) (Eng.).
112. See Scovil v. Kennedy, 14 Conn. 349 (1841) (ordering partition of a right
held in co~tenancy to water in a stream used to power two mills by equalizing the size of
the orifices used to draw water from the stream); Turner v. Morgan, 8 Ves. 143 (1803)
(allotting to one party all of the chimneys and the sole staircase of a house).
113. 31 & 32 Vict., c. 40 (1868) (Eng.).
114. ORTH, supra note 111, at 88-89; Loyd, supra note 1, at 175;. See also Reid,
supra note 61, at 860 (asserting that "the Partition Act of 1868 turned the prevailing
partition law on its head by favoring sales over partition in kind.").
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American Law

American colonies, under the influence of English rule,
adopted the laws of England. 115 Early charters included the same
provisions for partition as existed in England at the time,l16 During
colonial times, the writ of partition as established by the Act of
Henry VIII,117 was incorporated into statute and continued to exist
in the statutes adopted by some nascent states. 118 After 1776,
American legislatures were not obligated to incorporate the later
English laws, such as the Partition Act,119 into statute and Ameri
can courts were not bound to adhere to English common law. 120
However, in the absence of American case law, many early courts
used English common law to guide or substantiate their opinions. 121
As stated above, English courts of chancery had assumed jurisdic
tion of actions for partition after the Act of Henry VIIJ122 was
passed 123 and the role of equity in partition was quite developed,l24
Therefore, prior to the Act of 1833125 and the Partition Act,126 the
115. Reid, supra note 61, at 860-61.
116. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21, at 94; ORTH, supra
note 111, at 88-89; POWELL, supra note 94, § 50.07[1], at 50-37; 4 TiFFANY, supra note
91, § 473, at 307; Loyd, supra note 1, at 175-76. See Reid, supra note 61, at 861 n.37
(detailing early colonial legislation allowing partition).
117. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1539) (Eng.).
118. Loyd, supra note 1, at 177-84; Reid, supra note 61, at 861 n.37.
119. 31 & 32 Vict., c. 40 (1868) (Eng.).
120. Some commentators attribute the various similarities between English law
and American law to "the influence of the Crown" during the early colonial days. See
Loyd, supra note 1, at 176. The distinct differences may be rooted in the colonial rejec
tion of the European system of primogeniture, a system under which the eldest son
inherited all of the land, in favor of a more equal distribution among all of the dece
dent's children. The latter system of distribution created more joint tenancies, which
necessitated some method of equitable dissolution to prevent land from becoming ina
lienable. [d. at 177-78.
121. Many early opinions referred to English case law for the general principle of
law or for guidance by example, even negative example. See, e.g., Richardson v. Mon
son, 23 Conn. 94, 95-96 (1854); Scovil v. Kennedy, 14 Conn. 349, 354 (1841); Wood v.
Little, 35 Me. 107, 110 (1853); Hanson v. Willard, 12 Me. 142, 146-47 (1835). See ORTH,
supra note 111, at 88-89 (stating that the Partition Act was "also copied in
America ...."); Casagrande, supra note 107, at 759-60 (stating that "American courts
and legislatures inevitably relied upon English legal precedent in the absence of their
own.").
122. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1539) (Eng.).
123. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21, at 94 (asserting that
equity had jurisdiction whenever an action at law resulting in the imposition of the
remedy of partition in kind produced unjust results).
124. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21, at 94-95; Loyd, supra
note 1, at 174.
125. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27 (1691) (Eng.).
126. 31 & 32 Viet., c. 40 (1868) (Eng.).
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concept that partition was an action in equity and that principles of
equity were inherent to partition were well-established in English
law. As American courts incorporated English law,127 the distinc
tion between equity and law in the context of partition became
blurred. 128 English courts of law and courts of chancery maintained
concurrent jurisdiction over partition during the period following
the enactment of the Act of Henry VIII129 until 1833,130 when parti
tion could only be sought through a bill in equity.l3l Although both
courts were limited to the remedies of partition in kind and owelty
partition, the results were often conflicting.132 The Partition Act 133
resolved this confusion by allowing both courts of law and of chan
cery the discretion to order partition by sale under the same stan
dard.134 Since the American law of partition was based almost
entirely on English law prior to the revolutionizing effects of the
Partition Act,135 most state statutes maintained concurrent jurisdic
tion in law and equity.136 Thus equity never lost jurisdiction over
actions for partition, and the codification of partition into state stat
utes did not displace the principles of equity inherent in
partition. 137
The prevalence of concurrent jurisdiction in law and equity led
127. 59A AM. lUR. 2D Partition § 26 obs. (2003); ORTH, supra note 111, at 88-89.
128. Hill v. Reno, 112 Ill. 154, 159 (Ill. 1883); Wright v. Marsh, Lee & Delavan, 2
Greene 94, 104-05 (Iowa 1849), available at 1849 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 9, at 22. But see
Copeland v. Giles, 123 So. 2d 147, 148 (Ala. 1960) (holding that "a court of equity in
this state has no original or inherent jurisdiction to order the sale of lands for division
among the joint owners.").
129. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1539) (Eng.).
130. Loyd, supra note 1, at 172-73.
131. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21, at 94-95; 2 TIFFANY,
supra note 91, § 473, at 307.
132. Loyd, supra note 1, at 174 (discussing the procedural wrangling in Turner v.
Morgan, 8 Ves. 143 (1803), concerning an order of partition in kind and the court's
refusal to utilize owelty).
133. 31 & 32 Vict., c. 40 (1868) (Eng.).
134. Id. (holding that "the court must order a sale on request of the owners of a
moiety in the property unless good reason is shown to the contrary; and may, in its
discretion, order a sale at the request of any owner, if it appears that it will be beneficial
by reason of the nature of the property, the number or disability of the parties, or other
circumstances."). See also Loyd, supra note 1, at 175.
135. 31 & 32 Vict., c. 40 (1868) (Eng.).
136. Wright v. Marsh, Lee & Delavan, 2 Greene 94, 106-07 (Iowa 1849), available
at 1849 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 9, at *18-22; Williams v. Coombs, 33 A. 1073 (Me. 1895);
Hanson v. Willard, 12 Me. 142, 147 (1835); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note
98, § 6.21, at 95; 2 TIFFANY, supra note 91, § 473, at 307; Loyd, supra note 1, at 185.
137. Clements v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 124 S.E. 516, 516 (Ga. 1924); Hess v.
Voss, 52 Ill. 472, 473 (Ill. 1869), available at 1869 WL 5477, at *2; Rothert v. Rothert,
441 N.E.2d 179, 182 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), Wright, 2 Greene at 106-07, available at 1849
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to some interesting developments in American partition law. Most
states had specifically incorporated the limited remedies of parti
tion in kind and payment of owelty into statute. 138 Therefore, re
gardless of whether the co-tenant presented a writ under the
common law, a petition under the statute, or a bill in chancery, the
court's powers at law and in equity were restricted by the same two
inflexible remedies. In fact, some courts ceased to distinguish be
tween an action at law and a bill in equity.1 39 This limitation as to
remedies created the same quandary for American courts as con
fronted by the English courts prior to 1868. 140 Since any co-tenant
had a right to demand partition, the court was obligated to devise a
plan for equitable partition. 141 Yet frequently both remedies were
too rigid and inflexible to accommodate the unique nature of the
property at issue,142 and the results often failed to accomplish the
very purpose of partition. 143
Iowa Sup. LEXIS 9, a,t *19-22, Dall v. Confidence Silver Mining Co., 3 Nev. 531, 533
(1867), available at 1867 WL 2077, *2.
138. See, e.g., Hanson, 12 Me. at 147-48 (expanding the available remedies to
include sale); Arms v. Lyman, 22 Mass. 210, 211 (1827) (restricting authority of probate
court to order partition in kind or payment of owelty citing state statute of 1817). See
also Casagrande, supra note 107, at 760; Loyd, supra note 1, at 174-75; Merrill Isaac
Schnebly, Power of Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extinguish Other Interests by Judi
cial Process, 42 HARV. L. REv. 30, 31-32.
139. Hanson, 12 Me. at 147 (noting that "[t]he bill for partition [in equity] is in
the nature of a writ for partition ...."); Reid, supra note 61, at 861. See also 4 TIFFANY,
supra note 91, § 473, at 307. But see O'Brien v. Mahoney, 60 N.E. 493, 494 (Mass. 1901)
(noting that "this remedy [petition in equity], extended and improved from time to
time, has substantially superseded in practice the old writ."); Schnebly, supra note 139,
at 31 (commenting that the common law action for partition has been displaced by the
equitable remedy (citing FREEMAN, supra note 89, ch. 19)).
140. See Craig-Taylor, supra note 61, at 747 (discussing the dilemma created by
the remedy of forced judicial sales).
141. Limited to partition in kind and owelty, many defendants attempted to argue
that the difficulties in making partition and the resulting inconveniences were sufficient
grounds to deny the plaintiff's demand. All of these objections were rebuffed at length
in the opinions, which re-affirmed that any co-tenant had an absolute right to partition
regardless of the resulting difficulties or inconveniences. Scovil v. Kennedy, 14 Conn.
349, 353 (1841); Hanson, 12 Me. at 146-47.
142. See Scovil, 14 Conn. at 351 (affirming order of construction of two orifices of
equal diameter at the same level at great expense so as to equitably divide the water
powering a mill that had been ordered physically divided to create two mills); Loyd,
supra note 1, at 174-75.
143. See VT. STAT. ANN. § 5162 (1973) (stating that real estate containing a spring
and rights to use the water from the spring could be partitioned "in the same manner as
other real estate" by "equitably apportion[ing] the use of such water and the manner of
its use"). This resolution sounds remarkably like a continuation of the same relation
ship. In addition, some state statutes protected particular businesses or property inter
ests from partition since it was recognized that partition in kind would destroy the
business and the value of the property. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Partition of Real
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State legislatures, empowered by the United States Constitu
tion to regulate property and property rights,144 did not hesitate to
enact statutes authorizing courts to order partition by sale. In fact,
many states had enacted such statutes prior to the Civil War,145 a
point that re-affirms the independent development of partition in
America. These statutes expanded the available remedies to in
clude partition by sale and extended the powers of the courts by
allowing them to order judicial sales, in their discretion, subject to a
minimal standard. 146
Despite the early date of many of these statutes, partition by
sale never became the prevalent or the preferred remedy in
America. 147 In fact, partition in kind remains the preferred remedy
in the statutes and in the common law.1 48 This unique American
Estate, § 6506 (West 1964) (limiting the partition of tenancies in common of sawmills to
temporal partition only).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 & amend. X (reserving to the states rights not enu
merated to the federal government).
145. See, e.g., Richardson v. Monson, 23 Conn. 94,98 (1854) (asserting that "stat
utes authorizing this [the sale of real estate] are to be found in every state"), Wood v.
Little, 35 Me. 107, 111 (1853) (stating that "[i]n England and many of the States, per
haps the most common mode of proceeding [is] ... to decree a sale of the whole es
tate"). Cf Hanson, 12 Me. at 144 (1835) (determining that, although the statute
authorized partition by writ, it did not specify the mode of partition). But see Reid,
supra note 61, at 861 (contending that "[t]hese statutes, permitting only partitions in
kind, remained in effect until after the Civil War ...."). The Civil War began in 1861
and ended in 1865; Parliament did not enact the Partition Act until 1868. By 1922, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota summarized the prevalence of statutes authorizing
sales stating: "It is sufficient to observe that such laws, perhaps in slightly varying forms,
are in force in every state in the Union ...." Kluthe v. Hammerquist, 188 N.W. 749,
750 (S.D. 1922). But see Hayden v. Denslow, 27 Conn. 335 (1858) (dismissing a petition
in chancery for partition by sale of property where the petitioners had no equitable title
and were not in possession of the land in question).
146. Wright v. Marsh, Lee & Delavan, 2 Greene 94, 105 (Iowa 1849), available at
1849 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 9, at *22.
147. Reid, supra note 61, at 862 (stating that "[t]he American statutes thus made
judicial sales available to American landowners but not as readily as under the English
Act of 1868, which promoted and encouraged sales of the common property.").
148. Peck v. Peck, 157 N.E.2d 249, 260 (Ill. 1959); Rothert v. Rothert, 441 N.E.2d
179, 182 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Tri-State Concrete Co. v. Stephens, 395 So. 2d 894, 896
(La. Ct. App. 1981); Williams v. Coombs, 33 A. 1073, 1075 (Me. 1895); Swogger v.
Taylor, 68 N.W.2d 376, 384 (Minn. 1955); Trowbridge v. Donner, 40 N.W.2d 655, 660
(Neb. 1950); Schnell v. Schnell, 346 N.W.2d 713, 716 (N. D. 1984); Hurst v. Hall, 574
P.2d 311, 312 (Or. 1978); Eli v. Eli, 557 N.W.2d 405, 408 (S.D. 1997); Geis v. Vallazza,
207 A.2d 248, 252 (Vt. 1965); Blanchard v. Cross, 123 A. 382, 383 (Vt. 1924); Roberts v.
Coleman, 16 S.E. 482, 486 (W. Va. 1892). This preference remains a rule of law even in
the modern era. See generally Reid, supra note 61 (arguing that although the prefer
ence for partition in kind is codified in statute, reiterated in numerous judicial opinions
and a commonly held rule of law, the majority of partition actions are resolved by judi
cial sale for the sake of finality, judicial economy and efficiency).
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preference for partition in kind may have been preserved for rea
sons outside of its historical origins. Partition in kind comports with
the established principles of law and property ownership because it
does not compel a person to sell his land,149 it does not disturb a
long-recognized form of inheritance-dividing land equally among
all children and creating a co-tenancy-or upset current ownership
of lands received via inheritance,150 and it does not sever personal
sentiments or feelings for land that developed over years and gener
ations by displacing families or family members from their land. 151
Partition in kind reinforced the more egalitarian method of inheri
tance adopted in America, which rejected the European tradition of
primogeniture, by providing a method of dissolving the co-tenancy
while granting each heir a portion of the actual land. 152 It en
couraged parties to explore the abundance of unchartered and un
settled lands and to file land claims jointly with full knowledge that
they could seek an equitable partition should they so desire in the
future. 153 Co-tenants at American law are treated like partners in a
business partnership; partition dissolves the partnership and distrib
utes the asset, the land, according to the interests of each party.
And yet co-tenancies seem to occur more often in the private con
text, partnerships and businesses being governed by a separate
body of law.1 54 In the private context, the parties' relationships to
the land are often complicated by more personal kinds of land own
ership, such as the family farm, the family home, or the ancestral
homestead. 155 American jurisprudence struggled to reconcile the
149. Phillips v. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Neb. 1960); Schnell, 346 N.W.2d at
720-21; Eli, 557 N.W.2d at 411; Croston v. Male, 49 S.E. 136, 137 (W. Va. 1904); Rob
erts, 16 S.E. at 486.
150. Schnell, 346 N.W.2d at 720-21; Eli, 557 N.W.2d at 411.
151. Schnell, 346 N.W.2d at 721 (asserting that each co-tenant has "the right to
preserve the heritage of [her] labors ....").
152. Loyd, supra note 1, at 176-77. See Long v. Long, 1 Watts. 265,269 (Pa. 1832)
(stating "[i]n this state, our statute regulating the descent of real estate, passes it upon
the death of the party, dying seised and intestate, to his children equally, to hold it as
tenants in common ....").
153. Lavalle v. Strobel, 89 Ill. 370, 381, 386 (1878) (holding that assignment of lots
to each co-tenant on original plat of land purchased jointly for development was valid
partition). See generally Loyd, supra note 1, at 177.
154. During the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century,
courts were asked to partition cotton mills (Wood v. Little, 35 Me. 107-08 (1853)), saw
mills (Morrill v. Morrill, 5 N.H. 134 (1830)), and even hotels (Willard v. Willard, 145
U.S. 116 (1892)).
155. See e.g. Ford v. Kirk, 41 Conn. 9 (1874) (dismissing an action to partition
land inherited in part by both the plaintiff and the defendant where the plaintiff's title
to some lands acquired through tax liens was questionable); Kelley v. Madden, 40
Conn. 274 (1873) (granting partition in kind of a farm purchased by a brother and sister
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objective requirements that the court fashion a remedy upon a peti
tion for partition with the rather sUbjective nature of the parties'
relationships to the land in the context of ordering a judicial sale.
The new statutes authorizing sale imposed a standard of proof,
variously worded in the different states, that codified the preference
for partition in kind and the equitable nature of the remedy of
sale. 156 The remedy of sale was available only where the petitioner
could show that a sale would better promote the interests of all of
the parties. 157 The inverse formulation, used by the majority of
states,158 required that the petitioner show that partition in kind
jointly);Wilson v. Peck, 39 Conn. 54 (1872) (denying petitioners partition of a piece of
land which the grantor had conveyed with the stated purpose of establishing a family
burial ground); Coxe v. Coxe, 481 A.2d 86 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (ordering partition in
kind of a family farm which served as the residence and sole source of income to a
widow and her two sons); Schnell, 346 N.W.2d at 713 (reversing an order of sale in favor
of partition in kind of a family owned ranch of approximately four thousand five hun
dred acres); Maupin v. Opie, 964 P.2d 1117 (Or. 1998) (reversing order of private sale
and ordering public sale of six thousand acre family ranch, which court found was not
susceptible of partition in kind because smaller parcels could not support ranching ac
tivity and reduction in value would cause great prejudice to owners); Eli v. Eli, 557
N.W.2d 405, 405 (S.D. 1997) (reversing an order of sale of one hundred twelve acre
parcel and remanding for partition in kind); Nelson v. Hendricks, 54 N.W.2d 324 (S.D.
1952) (affirming order of sale of eight hundred forty acre farm based on finding that
property could not be partitioned in kind without great prejudice to the owners).
156. The remedy of sale developed in equity to lessen the injustice of the limited
remedies of partition in kind and owelty. Thus, where the petitioner can show that
partition in kind will cause injury, a court will order partition by sale. 59A AM. JUR. 2D
Partition § 1 (2003); AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21, at 95-6; 2
TIFFANY, supra note 91, § 479.1, at 206-07. See also Idema v. Comstock, 110 N.W. 786,
787 (Wis. 1907) (citing WIS. REv. STAT. § 3119 (1898)) (affirming that "the equitable
rule has been made a matter of written law providing for a sale for the purposes of
partition only when partition in kind would result in 'great prejudice to the owners' ").
157. Connecticut enacted a partition act in 1848 authorizing sale "whenever in the
opinion of the court a sale will better promote the interests of all parties than a parti
tion." Johnson v. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 509, 513 (1882). See also Sensabaugh v. Sen
sabaugh, 349 S.E.2d 141, 144 (Va. 1986) (requiring showing that the interests of those
entitled to the property or the proceeds "will be promoted by a sale." (citing VIRGINIA
CODE § 8.01-83)); Blanchard v. Cross, 123 A. 382, 384 (Vt. 1924), Roberts v. Coleman,
16 S.E. 482, 486 (W. Va. 1892) (requiring that a sale promote the interests of the par
ties). The language of the Connecticut statute mirrors the English Partition Act of 1868
and yet predates it by twenty years. But see Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 761 A.2d 1283,
1288 (Conn. 2000) (claiming that "[i]n Connecticut, an act extending the power of our
courts to order a sale in partition proceedings was enacted in 1844." (citing 1844 Pub.
Acts C. XIII)).
158. See Williams v. Coombs, 33 A. 1073, 1074 (Me. 1895) (finding that "property
could not be divided without greatly impairing its value ...."); Codman v. Tinkham, 32
Mass. 364, 365 (1834) (ordering sale upon finding that "a division of [of] the land could
not be made without greatly diminishing the value of the whole."); Leavitt v. Benzing,
82 A.2d 86, 87 (N.H. 1951) (establishing that right to sale depends in part on finding
that property cannot be divided without great prejudice); Maupin v. Opie, 964 P.2d
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was impracticable,159 i.e. physically impossible, or that it would be
greatly prejudicial or result in great inconvenience to the parties.1 60
Thus the petitioner had to present proof sufficient to rebut the codi
fied presumption that partition in kind was the appropriate rem
edy.161 The interests of the petitioning party carried no more
weight than those of any other party or parties in determining the
appropriate remedy.162 The proof lay in the facts and circum
1117,1123 (Or. 1998) (citing Fike v. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Or. 1977) (holding
that "[t]he 'established test' to determine whether partition in kind would result in great
prejudice to the owners is 'whether the value of the share of each in case of a partition
would be materially less than his share of the money equivalent that could probably be
obtained for the whole."'); Eli, 557 N.W.2d at 408; Nelson, 54 N.W.2d at 324;
Blanchard, 123 A. at 383-84 (stating that "[t]he language used in the statute[s] [sic] of
different states varies somewhat ... making 'great inconvenience' the test; but the es
sential consideration is the pecuniary welfare of the owners."); Idema v. Comstock, 110
N.W. 786, 787 (Wis. 1907) (citing WIS. REV. STAT. § 3119 (1898) (noting that "the estab
lished test of whether partition in kind would result in 'great prejudice to the owners' is
whether the value of the share of each in case of a partition would be materially less
than his share of the money equivalent that could probably be obtained for the
whole."). See also 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition, § 191 (2003).
159. See Johnson, 49 Conn. at 517 (holding that "[e]very owner with another is
entitled to separate ownership by one of these; by partition first and always, if that is
possible; if it is not, then by sale"). See also Candee v. Candee, 86 A. 758, 759 (Conn.
1913) (citing Johnson, 49 Conn. at 509); Bell v. Smith, 71 S.W. 433, 434 (Ky. 1903);
Williams, 33 A. at 1074 (finding that the house was "not susceptible of division and
separate occupancy ...."); Nelson, 54 N.W.2d at 325 (finding that ranch with one group
of farm buildings constituted "single operating unit" not susceptible to division); Benet
v. Ford, 74 S.E. 394, 397 (Va. 1912) (ordering the land sold upon showing that it was not
susceptible to division in kind).
160. See Cates v. Johnson, 19 So. 416, 416 (Ala. 1896); Johnson, 49 Conn. at 518;
Richardson vs. Monson, 23 Conn. 94, 95 (1854); Williams, 33 A. at 1075; Wilson v.
European & N. Am. R.R. Co., 62 Me. 112, 112 (1873), available at 1873 WL 3171, at *1;
Codman, 32 Mass. at 365; Kluthe v. Hammerquist, 188 N.W. 749, 750 (S.D. 1922); Cros
ton v. Male, 49 S.E. 136, 138 (W. Va. 1904); Roberts, 16 S.E. 482, 486 (W. Va. 1892).
161. See, e.g., Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116, 119 (1892); Johnson, 49 Conn. at
517; Tri-State Concrete Co. v. Stephens, 395 So. 2d 894, 896 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Swog
ger v. Taylor, 68 N.W.2d 376, 384 (Minn. 1955); Phillips v. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d 52, 56
(Neb: 1960); Schnell, 346 N.W.2d at 716; Eli, 557 N.W.2d at 408; Nelson, 54 N.W.2d at
324; Kluthe, 188 N.W. at 750; ldema, 110 N.W.2d at 787 (holding that petitioner has
burden of showing that partition in kind cannot be made without inconvenience or
prejudice to owners).
162. See Kluthe, 188 N.W. at 750; Croston, 49 S.E. at 139. See also Reitmeier v.
Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565, 578 (D. N.J. 1986) (providing a succinct, modern statement
of the principle). The court in Reitmeier asserts that "[i]t is an established principle that
a court of equity, in decreeing partition, does not act ministerially and in obedience to
the call of those who have a right to the partition, but founds itself on its general juris
diction as a court of equity, and administers its relief ... according to its own notions of
general justice and equity between the parties." Id. This principle is a slight modifica
tion of the established tenet of partition that the right to partition prevails over and
despite the objections of other co-tenants, unless a superior claim in inequity has been
presented.
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stances of each individual case,163 The unique character of the
land,164 the number of parties claiming an interest,165 the quantity
and quality of improvements to and attachments on the land 166
were all factors that a court would consider in determining the rem
edy. The existence of these same factors made the land in question
resistant to equitable partition in kind. 167 Yet prior to the enact
ment of statutes authorizing partition by sale, difficulty in making
the partition, any inconveniences to the parties, and even the de
struction of the value of the property were insufficient reasons to
deny partition. 168 "[I]t is no sufficient objection to a partition that it
would be attended with the most inconvenient consequences, and
that the value of the property so much depends on its entireness,
that its division would materially lessen that value."169 Courts were
forced to provide a remedy for a right asserted,170 even where the
only available remedy caused more harm than the injury for which
163. See Willard, 145 U.S. at 118 (asserting that "[t]he right to a sale depends
altogether upon statute, and will only be directed when the facts and circumstances
required by statute to authorize it are affirmatively made to appear."); Swogger, 68
N.W.2d at 380 (establishing that statutory provisions for partition neither restricted nor
impaired "the court's inherent power to do equity as the peculiar circumstances of each
case might require."); Nelson, 54 N.W.2d at 324 (holding that the determination of
whether the land in controversy could be partitioned in kind was a question for the trial
court based on the evidence presented).
164. See Candee, 86 A. at 760 (finding that "[i]t is manifest that this real estate [an
irregularly shaped parcel of fifty-five acres of which forty was swampland] cannot be
advantageously divided."); Rutherford v. Jones, 14 Ga. 521, 524 (1854), available at
1854 WL 1494, *1-3 (indicating difficulty in dividing twenty-five city lots); Hess v. Voss,
52 Ill. 472 (1869), available at 1869 WL 5477, *1-2 (finding that an undivided one fourth
interest in an improved city lot was not susceptible of division); Idema, 110 N.W. at 787
(stating that "quantity and quality [are] relatively considered ....").
165. Candee, 86 A. at 759-60 (indicating that the number of "distributees of the
estate" was a factor in determining that partition in kind would not be in the best inter
ests of the parties).
166. See Johnson v. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 509, 509-11 (1882) (ordering the sale of a
parcel of land in the city of Hartford containing three buildings owned jointly by twelve
persons, only three of whom were ascertained by the court, each having one, one hun
dred forty-fourth part, finding a sale in the best interest of the property and the parties);
Bell v. Smith, 71 S.W. 433, 434 (Ky. 1903) (determining that improved city lot was not
susceptible of division without materially impairing value); Williams v. Coombs, 33 A.
1073,1074 (Me. 1895) (determining that city lot containing one house was not suscepti
ble of division). But see Eaton v. Hackett, 352 A.2d 748, 752 (Me. 1976) (affirming a
division of two lots containing four buildings).
167. See generally supra note 165 and infra notes 220-23 (revealing the diversity
of factors considered and some regional differences in how the quantity of land affects
the remedy).
168. See generally Scovil v. Kennedy, 14 Conn. 349, 360 (1841); Hanson v. Wil
lard, 12 Me. 142, 146 (1835).
169. Hanson, 12 Me. at 146.
170. Id.; Morrill v. Morrill, 5 N.H. 134, 136 (1830).
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the petitioner had sought judicial reliefpl This seemingly ridicu
lous rule was an attempt to reconcile the absolute nature of the
right to partition and the inevitable results of the only available
remedy, partition in kind. These factors took on a new significance
with the introduction of the remedy of sale. Under the statutes au
thorizing sale, courts were required to consider any evidence rele
vant to its determination as to the suitable method of partition.I 72
However, the statutes offered no guidance as to what facts were
pertinent, the weight to be accorded such facts, the quantity of evi
dence necessary to overcome the presumption, or even what these
threshold standards, "in the best interest" or "greatly prejudicial"
meant. 173 All of these judgments were within the broad discretion
171. Codman v. Tinkham, 32 Mass. 364, 366-67 (1834) (interpreting strictly the
statute authorizing owelty partition and thereby preventing the owner of eight undi
vided ninth parts of a city lot containing buildings from obtaining the other undivided
ninth part at fair market value); Morrill, 5 N.H. at 332 (affirming actual partition of the
lands of a saw-mill leaving one half inaccessible except by traveling over the other half).
172. Blanchard v. Cross, 123 A. 382, 384 (Vt. 1924) (finding that "[i]f the offered
evidence was admissible, it was because it tended to show that the pecuniary interests of
the owners ... would not be enhanced by a sale of the property."); Cauthorn v.
Cauthorn,85 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Va. 1955) (allowing that a court of equity is authorized to
sell jointly held lands, "[i]f the court determines from competent evidence in the record
before it that the land is not susceptible of division in kind ....").
173. Most jurisdictions measure "best interests" and "greatly prejudicial" in mon
etary terms, thus the highest price obtainable is in the parties best interests, or con
versely the remedy that impairs or diminishes the value of the property is deemed
"greatly prejudicial." See, e.g., Rutherford v. Jones, 14 Ga. 521, 524 (1854), available at
1854 WL 1494, *3 (commenting that partition in kind would greatly depreciate the
value of the land); Rothert v. Rothert, 441 N.E.2d 179, 182-83 (Ill. 1982) (establishing
value of property for owelty settlement); Welch v. Zucco, 665 So. 2d 697, 701 (La. Ct.
App. 1995) (establishing minimum bid indicated plaintiff's efforts to obtain fair market
value); Tri-State Concrete Co., Inc. v. Stephens, 395 So. 2d 894, 897 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(allowing sale so that owners might "realize the full present value of the prop
erty ...."); Williams v. Coombs, 33 A. 1073, 1074 (Me. 1895) (opining that the "prop
erty could not be divided without impairing its value"); Phillips v. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d
52,56 (Neb. 1960); Trowbridge v. Donner, 40 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Neb. 1950) (discussing
value of a share relative to the whole following partition in kind). However, some juris
dictions considered more subjective factors, such as the parties' relationship to the land
and financial situation. See Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 31-32 (Conn. 1980) (dis
cussing economic impact on defendant whose residence and business were located on
property at issue); Coxe v. Coxe, 481 A.2d 86, 88 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (describing
defendant's farm as "the sole source of income and livelihood to the family."); Whiteley
v. Whiteley, 84 A. 68, 69-70 (Md. 1912) (noting that appellant had bid on property
because "it had been his father's home."); Kent v. Kent, 835 P.2d 8, 10 (Nev. 1992)
(endorsing trial court's approach, which was "motivated by a desire to keep each
brother in his respective business ...."); Schnell v. Schnell, 346 N.W.2d 713, 716 (N.D.
1984) (citing "financial ability of one of the parties to purchase the property ...");
Maupin v. Opie, 964 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Or. 1998) (discussing parties' personal history on
land in question).
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ary powers granted to the courts by the statutes. 174 In order to
make the remedy of sale available, the court had to take the inter
ests of all of the parties I75 and the particular circumstances regard
ing the land into considerationY6 In doing so, courts were
exercising their equitable powers to provide full and complete
justice.
Eventually, every state included partition by sale as a rem
edy.177 Although courts recognized and used the remedy of sale,
they did so reluctantly.178 The tortured (and rather tortuous) lan
guage of early opinions reveals that courts were uncomfortable or
dering the sale of land held in commonY9 "The statute giving the
power of sale introduces, as we think, no new principle; it provides
only for an emergency, when a division cannot be well made, in any
other way."180 Courts used these "prejudice tests" to overcome the
conflict between the right of any co-tenant to partition and the rem
edy of sale,181 which divested the owners of their objective, legal
174. See Cauthorn v. Cauthorn, 85 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Va. 1955) (concluding that
"the court is given broad powers to deal with the subject [the land] as the interest of the
parties and the circumstances of the case may require.").
175. Hayden v. Denslow, 27 Conn. 335, 343 (1858) (asserting that "[t]he powers
conferred on the court by the statute under which this application [for partition by sale]
is made are extraordinary powers ... , Such a power ought to be exercised with a
careful regard to the rights of the parties objecting to the sale."); Kent, 835 P.2d at 10
(Nev. 1992) (affirming that the "manner and method of partition is properly animated
by concern for the interests of the individual parties ..."); Schnell, 346 N.W.2d at 716
(factoring in the "situation of the parties and their respective financial abilities").
176. See Croston v. Male, 49 S.E. 136, 139 (W. Va. 1904) (holding that "[i]t is the
duty of the court, before decreeing a sale in a partition suit, to judicially determine the
rights and interests of the co-tenants in the land, and failure to do so is ordinarily re
versible error. ").
177. See Williams v. Coombs, 33 A. 1073, 1074 (Me. 1895); Swogger v. Taylor, 68
N.W.2d 376, 381 (Minn. 1955); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.26,
at 113; 7 POWELL, supra note 94, § 50.07[5], at 50-49; 4 TIFFANY, supra note 91, § 474, at
309; Reid, supra note 61, at 861-62.
178. See Reid, supra note 61, at 861 (stating that "[t]he American statutes thus
made judicial sales available to American landowners but not as readily as under the
English Act of 1868 [Partition Act], which promoted and encouraged the sale of the
common property."). But see Craig-Taylor, supra note 61, at 752 (arguing, rather un
persuasively, that "the forced judicial partition sale was an American innovation.").
179. "It is a very great exercise of authority for the legislature to deprive a person
of his interest in land against his will; to have such property sold and oblige the owners
to take money which they may be unable to invest or ignorant of how to take care of."
Johnson v. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 509, 515-16 (1882).
180. Richardson v. Monson, 23 Conn. 94, 96 (1854).
181. See Craig-Taylor, supra note 61, at 747 (discussing the dilemma created be
tween the rights of co-tenants to partition and the rights of owners forced to sell their
land).
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relationship to the land 182 and severed their subjective, personal
ties to the land. 183 This discomfiture was expressed in different
ways as courts attempted to impose some cognizable restraints on
the power of the judiciary in ordering judicial sales. Two obvious
control mechanisms became part of the common law: (1) courts'
refusal to extend the absolute nature of the right to partition to
include the remedy of partition by sale,184 and (2) courts' rejection
of the well-established principle that equity is inherent to partition
actions where the remedy requested is sale. 18S These courts instead
relied on statutes to prescribe and proscribe their powers.
Following the enactment of the Partition Act of 1868,186 En
glish courts held that the right to partition included the right to par
tition by sale. 187 This conflated both the action and remedy, leaving
no room for courts to exercise the discretion granted by the Parti
tion Act,188 despite equity's almost exclusive jurisdiction over parti
tion after 1833.1 89 The right to partition in American law occupied
a more tenuous position when the remedy demanded was sale.
Some courts held that the right to demand partition remained abso
182. "It [sale] differs materially from a partition .... [I]n the case of sale all this
is changed. The owners are entirely deprived of their property. Its very nature is
changed. A sale is forced perhaps at a time and in a manner most unfavorable to the
owners." Johnson, 49 Conn. at 516.
183. Kent v. Kent, 835 P.2d 8, 10 (Nev. 1992); Schnell v. Schnell, 346 N.W.2d 713,
716 (N.D. 1984) (citing as factors in determining the appropriate remedy "[s]entimental
reasons, particularly in the preservation of a home ...."); Fike v. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252,
1254 (Or. 1977). See Craig-Taylor, supra note 61, at 767-769 (arguing that partition by
sale divests African-Americans of the economic, cultural and personal benefits of land
ownership). See also Manel Baucells & Steven A. Lippman, Justice Delayed is Justice
Denied: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis of Hold-Up in Co-Ownership, App. B:
Delfino v. Vealencis: Origin and Resolution, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1191, 1220-48 (2001)
(providing a probative discussion of the decision-making process and the power of ef
fective narrative in partition litigation).
184. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21, at 95-6. See, e.g.,
Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116, 118-19 (1892); Copeland v. Giles, 123 So. 2d 147, 148
(Ala. 1960); Leake v. Casati, 363 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Va. 1988); Sensabaugh v. Sensabaugh,
349 S.E.2d 141,144 (Va. 1986); Cauthorn v. Cauthorn, 85 S.E.2d 256, 258-59 (Va. 1955);
Blanchard v. Cross, 123 A. 382, 383 (Vt. 1924); Croston v. Male, 49 S.E. 136, 137 (W.
Va. 1904).
185. See Sensabaugh, 349 S.E.2d at 144; Cauthorn, 85 S.E.2d at 258-59. But see
Dall v. Confidence Silver Mining Co., 3 Nev. 531, available at 1867 WL 2077, at *2
(holding that "[w]hen the statute prescribes a course to be pursued, that course must
doubtless be followed so far as it goes, but beyond it the general principles [of eq
uity] ... should control the action of the courts.").
186. 31 & 32 Vict., c. 40 (1868) (Eng.).
187. See Reid, supra note 61, at 860.
188. 31 & 32 Vict., c. 40 (1868) (Eng.).
189. 2 TIFFANY, supra note 91, § 473, at 307.
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lute, but that no right to a particular remedy existed.1 90 Other
courts held that the right to partition had been expanded to include
the remedy of partition by sale. l91 In 1892, the United States Su
preme Court confirmed that partition by sale was a valid remedy
but held that "[t]he right to a sale depends altogether upon statute,
and will only be directed when the facts and circumstances required
by statute to authorize it are affirmatively made to appear. The
onus is always on him who seeks the sale. "192 Placing the burden of
proof on the petitioner requesting sale reinforced the preference
for partition in kind by transforming it into a rebuttable
presumption.
The Supreme Court ruling in Willard v. Willard,193 that the
right to sale depended on statute, was interpreted by some courts to
mean that jurisdiction over partition in kind was exclusively deter
mined by statute. 194 Other courts attempted to establish an inde
pendent basis for partition completely distinct from statute. These
held that, because partition had long been recognized as an action
in equity, the statutes could not deprive a court of its inherent
power in partition regardless of the nature of the remedy sought.1 95
Still others held that "[t]he doctrine is now universally conceded,
that courts of equity may exercise a general concurrent jurisdiction
with courts of law in all partition cases."196 Concurrent jurisdiction
existed "in cases of partition, whenever the remedy at law is insuffi
cient, or peculiar circumstances render the proceeding in equity
190. In an action at law, the petitioner must satisfy the requirements of the stat
ute authorizing sale. Once satisfied, however, the petitioner is entitled to the remedy
sought. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 86, § 191 (2003).
191. See, e.g., Cates v. Johnson, 19 So. 416, 417 (Ala. 1896).
192. Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116, 118-19 (1892). See also Johnson v. Olmsted,
49 Conn. 509, 518 (1882).
193. 145 U.S. at 118-119.
194. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21, at 95-96.
195. Hess v. Voss, 52 Ill. 472, 475 (1869), available at 1869 WL 5477, at *2; Nance
County v. Thomas, 20 N.W.2d 925, 928 (Neb. 1945). But see Copeland v. Giles, 123 So.
2d 147, 148 (Ala. 1960) (affirming an order of private sale granted in response to a bill
in equity seeking sale while simultaneously noting that "a court of equity in this state
has no original or inherent jurisdiction to order the sale of lands for division among the
joint owners; that the power to do so is statutory"). Copeland contradicts every attempt
to categorize the diversity of statutes and holdings by jurisdiction: exclusively by statute,
equity inherent in partition, or concurrent.
196. Wright v. Marsh, Lee & Delavan, 2 Greene 94, 105 (Iowa 1849), available at
1849 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 9, at *19-20. See also Williams v. Coombs, 33 A. 1073, 1074
(Me. 1895) (indicating that "this power [to decree a sale] will not be exercised whenever
an actual partition is practicable ...").
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more suitable and juSt."197 Concisely summarized, "[t]he jurisdic
tion of the court was threefold: (1) It was invested with all the cu
mulative and special powers created by the statute, (2) it retained
all chancery attributes except as otherwise provided by the act, (3)
it retained all its inherent common law authority so far as it could
be exercised consistently with the two preceding powers."198 These
different threads granting jurisdiction over partition actions defined
the courts' scope of authority. Thus those courts restricted by stat
ute could offer only the remedies made available by statute. How
ever, not all statutes attempted to proscribe the courts' discretion
and instead merely codified those powers that had existed inher
entlyor at common law. 199 Those states recognizing either an inde
pendent, inherent power in equity or concurrent jurisdiction were
not restricted by statute 200 and could use the principles of equity to
fashion a remedy otherwise unavailable at law or as required by the
facts and circumstances. 201
Sale was a recognized remedy for partition actions under the
common law by writ, by statutory action, or under a bill in chan
cery.202 As stated previously, in most states the common law writ
had been absorbed by statute, and the few states that retained the
common law writ as a valid action at law treated the writ the same
197. Clements v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 124 S.E. 516, 516 (Ga. 1924) (citing
GA. CiVIL CODE § 5355 (1910». Georgia Civil Code section 5506 went on to state,
"[fjor every right there shall be a remedy, and every court having jurisdiction of the one
may, if necessary, frame the other." Id. See Swogger v. Taylor, 68 N.W.2d 376, 381
(Minn. 1955) (permitting a court to exercise its equitable powers to tailor a remedy to
the particular facts and circumstances unrestricted by the specific provisions of the stat
ute). See also Croston v. Male, 49 S.E. 136, 138 (W. Va. 1904) (allowing that "where the
property is of such nature that the remedies of the law courts are inadequate to its
recovery, equity supplies the defect by the use of its more diverse and flexible
processes").
198. Wright, 2 Greene at 106-07, available at 1849 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 9, at *20-22.
See also Swogger, 68 N.W.2d at 381 (delineating the same three categories of
interpretation).
199. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.21 n.6 and accompa
nying text, at 95-6.
200. E.g., Whitten v. Whitten, 36 N.H. 326, 332 (1858) (stating that "the partition
of real estate is an undoubted branch of equity jurisdiction").
201. Swogger, 68 N.W.2d at 381 (establishing that courts of law had "full chancery
powers enabling them to do complete justice according to the circumstances of each
case"). One court based its determination that equity held jurisdiction for other rea
sons: "[t]he proceeding in equity is much more simple and convenient than that pro
vided by the statute, which is rendered difficult and annoying by a great number of rigid
rules as to details." Whitten, 36 N.H. at 332.
202. Loyd, supra note 1, at 188-89.
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as if it had been presented under the statute. 203 Following its transi
tion into courts of chancery shortly after the enactment of the Act
of Henry VIII,204 the writ of partition was held to have acquired
principles of equity.205 Thus the writ in American common law was
subject to these same principles of equity.206 In those states that
held that equity was inherent to an action for partition, it applied
without reference to whether the petition was presented as an ac
tion at law or in equity.207 Generally, those states that maintained
concurrent jurisdiction permitted the petitioner to request partition
by sale in either a bill in chancery or as an action at law under the
common law writ or statute. 208 Thus no matter the form of the peti
tion presented, whether the jurisdiction of the court was restricted
by statute, derived independently or maintained concurrently, prin
ciples of equity applied to all actions for partition by sale. 209
IV.
A.

PARTITION BY SALE

Determining Whether Petitioner is Entitled to a Sale

Although in some jurisdictions the absolute common law right
of any co-tenant to demand partition was expanded to include par
tition by sale,2l0 the majority of jurisdictions hold that the remedy
203. See Hanson v. Willard, 12 Me. 142 (Me. 1835). See also Clements v. Sea
board Air-Line Ry. Co., 124 S.E. 516, 516 (Ga. 1924) (referring to GA. CIVIL CODE
§ 5358 (1910), which stated that the writ was the same as an action at law under the
statute); O'Brien v. Mahoney, 60 N.E. 493 (Mass. 1901).
204. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1539) (Eng.).
205. Loyd, supra note 1, at 171 (noting that the origins of equity in partition
would be extremely difficult to ascertain).
206. Clements, 124 S.E. at 516.
207. See Copeland v. Giles, 123 So. 2d 147, 148 (Ala. 1960); Cates v. Johnson, 19
So. 416 (Ala. 1896); Clements, 124 S.E. at 516; Rothert v. Rothert, 441 N.E.2d 179 (Ill.
1982); Pierce v. Pierce, 123 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. 1954) (citing to the Partition Act of 1819, as
revised, which abolished the common law writ and the statutory petition at law and
established partition solely in chancery); Mechling v. Meyers, 120 N.E. 542 (Ill. 1918).
See also Wood v. Little, 35 Me. 107, 111 (1853) (claiming that "[i]n England and many
of the States, perhaps the most commOn mode of proceeding to procure partition is by
bill in chancery ... [and] [i]n these proceedings, the common practice is ... to decree a
sale of the whole estate and divide the proceeds").
208. See generally Wright v. Marsh, Lee & Delavan, 2 Greene 94 (Iowa 1849);
Wilson v. European & No. America R.R. Co., 62 Me. 112 (1873); Hanson v. Willard, 12
Me. 142, 146 (Me. 1835); O'Brien, 60 N.E. at 493; Swogger v. Taylor, 68 N.W.2d 376
(Minn. 1955).
209. Wright, 2 Greene at 105-07, available at 1849 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 9, at *19-22.
210. Cates, 19 So. at 417 (indicates that [p]artition or sale is a matter of right").
But see Mylin v. King, 35 So. 998, 998 (Ala. 1904) (accepting petitioner's amendment of
a bill for partition which set forth "the facts relied on to show that the land was incapa
ble of partition in kind, and therefore, a sale was necessary."). A co-tenant can force
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of partition by sale becomes available only upon sufficient proof
that the relevant facts and circumstances warrant a sale. 211 The pe
titioner must show that partition in kind is impracticable,212 will
cause great prejudice213 or great inconvenience to the parties,214 or
that partition by sale is in the best interests of the parties. 215 Some
courts interpret the inclusion of these standards to mean that the
right to partition by sale becomes absolute if the petitioner presents
evidence in satisfaction of the statutory standard.216 However, the
partition by sale "only after proving the property cannot be equitably divided in kind."
ALA. CODE § 35-6-20, n.l gen. consid. (1975 & repl. vol. 1991). Allowing a co-tenant to
force a sale as of right raises federal and state constitutional issues of equal protection
and due process of law. Kluthe v. Hammerquist, 188 N.W. 749, 750 (S.D. 1922) (ad
dressing claims that statutes authorizing partition by sale are unconstitutional).
211. Generally, "the burden is on those who seek a sale of the property in lieu of
partition in kind" to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a
statutory ground for such sale. Trowbridge v. Donner, 40 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Neb. 1950),
reiterated in Phillips v. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Neb. 1960). See also Eaton v. Hack
ett, 352 A.2d 748, 751 n.4 (Me. 1976); Morse v. Morse, 150 Me. 174, 178 (1954); Morrill
v. Morrill, 5 N.H. 329, 331 (1831); Maupin v. Opie, 964 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Or. 1998); Eli v.
Eli, 557 N.W.2d 405, 408-09 (S.D. 1997); Blanchard v. Cross, 123 A. 382, 384 (Vt. 1924).
212. Mylin v. King, 35 So. 998, 998 (Ala. 1904); Rutherford v. Jones, 14 Ga. 521
(1854), available at 1854 WL 1494, at *3; Peck v. Peck, 157 N.E.2d249, 260 (Ill. 1959);
Hill v. Reno, 112 Ill. 154, 163 (1883); Hess v. Voss, 52 Ill. 472, 472 (1869), available at
1869 WL 5477, at *1; Bell v. Smith, 71 S.W. 433,434 (Ky. 1903); Welch v. Zucco, 665 So.
2d 697, 699 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Tri-State Concrete Co. v. Stephens, 395 So. 2d 894, 897
(La. Ct. App. 1981); Eaton v. Hackett, 352 A.2d 748,752 (Me. 1976); Williams v.
Coombs, 33 A. 1073, 1074 (Me. 1895); Wood v. Little, 35 Me. 107, 109 (1853); Cauthorn
v. Cauthorn, 855 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Va. 1955).
213. Peck v. Peck, 157 N.E.2d 249, 286 (Ill. 1959); Mechling v. Meyers, 120 N.E.
542, 544 (Ill. 1918); Rothert v. Rothert, 441 N.E.2d 179, 182 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982); Wood
v. Little, 35 Me. 107, 109, 112 (1853); Codman v. Tinkham, 32 Mass. 364, 365 (1834);
Swogger v. Taylor, 68 N.W.2d 376, 384 (Minn. 1955); Phillips v. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d 52,
56 (Neb. 1960); Trowbridge v. Donner, 40 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Neb. 1950); Kent v. Kent,
835 P.2d 8, 10 (Nev. 1992); Dall v. Confidence Silver Mining Co., 3 Nev. 531, 532 (1868),
available at 1867 WL 2077, at *2; Leavitt v. Benzing, 82 A.2d 86, 87 (N.H. 1951); Schnell
v. Schnell, 346 N.W.2d 713, 716 (N.D. 1984); Kluthe v. Hammerquist, 188 N.W.2d 405,
408 (N.D. 1922); Maupin v. Opie, 964 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Or. 1998); Hurst v. Hall, 574
P.2d 311, 312 (Or. 1978); Haggerty v. Nobles, 419 P.2d 9, 12 (Or. 1966); Eli v. Eli, 557
N.W.2d 405, 408 (S.D. 1997); Leake v. Casati, 363 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Va. 1988); Croston v.
Male, 16 S.E. 136, 137 (W. Va. 1904).
214. Tri-State Concrete Co., 345 So. 2d at 896; Wilson v. European & N. America
R.R. Co., 62 Me. 112, 112 (1873); Wood, 35 Me. at 112; Leavitt, 82 A.2d at 87; Morrill, 5
N.H. at 331; Leake, 363 S.E.2d at 926; Cauthorn, 85 S.E.2d at 259; Blanchard, 123 A. at
384; Roberts v. Coleman, 16 S.E. 482, 486 (W. Va. 1892); Croston, 49 S.E. at 137 (W. Va.
1904).
215. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500 (a) (1991) (authorizing "[a]ny court of equi
table jurisdiction ... [to] ... order the sale of any property, real or personal, owned by
two or more persons, when, in the opinion of the court, a sale will better promote the
interests of the owners.").
216. Nelson v. Hendricks, 54 N.W.2d 324, 324 (S.D. 1952); Kluthe v. Hammer
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majority of state statutes do not restrict the extent of the courts'
discretion in determining whether a petitioner is entitled to a
sale. 217 The petitioner bears the burden of proof, but the court as
the finder of fact makes the ultimate decision as to whether a sale is
appropriate. 218 Courts consider a variety of facts and factors in
making this determination. 219 However, neither the petitioner's
preference nor the defendant's objections to partition by sale have
any bearing on the process or the decision. 220 Almost all state stat
utes require petitioners seeking partition to submit certain informa
tion, such as the names of all known owners, their title in the
property, and a description of the property, to the court. 221 The
statutes do not, however, specify what evidence is particularly rele
quist, 188 N.W. 749, 750 (S.D. 1922); Geis v. Vallazza, 207 A.2d 248, 252 (vt. 1965);
Blanchard, 123 A. at 383; Idema v. Comstock, 110 N.W. 786, 787 (Wis. 1907).
217. Many statutes contain specific provisions or terms reserving discretionary
power to the courts. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500 (1991) (permitting "[a]ny court of
equitable jurisdiction [to] order the sale of any property, ... when, in the opinion of the
court, a sale will better promote the interests of the owners."). Some states appoint
commissioners to make the determination of whether the land should be divided in
kind or sold subject to court approval. The commissioners are granted similarly broad
discretionary powers to provide a remedy within the statutory requirements. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1218 (2002) (allowing the commissioners to submit a report rec
ommending sale "[i]f the commissioners are of the opinion that fair and equitable divi
sion of the property ... cannot be made ..."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-420 (1987)
(stating that "the court may, if satisfied that the [commissioners'] report is just and
correct, make an order"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2181 (2003) (authorizing the referee or
referees to report to the court "[i]f it appears to the referee or referees that partition [in
kind] cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners ...."). Cf OR. REV. STAT.
§ 105.245 (2001) (entitling the petitioner to a sale "[i]f it is alleged in the complaint and
established by the evidence, or if it appears by the evidence to the satisfaction of the
court without an allegation in the complaint; that the property ... is so situated that
partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners ....").
218. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 185 (2003). See also id. §§ 186, 187 (2003) (es
tablishing the standard of review of commissioners' reports as the same as an appellate
court's review of a trial court's finding of facts).
219. Id. § 135 (2003) (delineating four factors that courts consider in deciding
whether to order a sale: (1) quantity (2) quality (3) value, and (4) impairment in the
value of the whole).
220. Crocker v. Cotting, 48 N.E. 1023, 1024 (Mass. 1898). But see Reitmeier v.
Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565,575 (D. N.J. 1986) (noting that the remedy was appropriate
because both parties requested partition).
221. See 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/17-102 (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS C.
241, § 6 (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2171 (2003) (providing that all facts regarding
owners and shares or interests, whether known or unknown, should be included in the
petition); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.215 (2001) (stating the complaint must contain the in
terests of all owners, to the extent known); VT. STAT. ANN. § 5163 (2002) (requiring all
three elements). Cf CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-502 (1991) (allowing the court to make an
order to protect the interests of any unknown parties).
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vant or admissible, or the weight to be given any facts or factors.222
The absence of any specific provisions in the statutes substantiates
the broad discretionary powers of the courts to mold a remedy ac
cording to the circumstances of each individual case. 223
These statutory standards do not specify what is meant by im
practicability, great prejudice, great inconvenience or the best inter
ests of the parties. Impracticability is a commonly cited reason for
not ordering partition in kind. Yet prior to the acceptance of the
remedy of sale, impossibility was not a recognized reason to dismiss
a suit for partition. 224 In truth of fact, the early English courts were
correct in ruling that all real property could be divided; the real
problem lay in the results. Actual division often destroyed the
property or greatly diminished its objective monetary value. 225
Both parties, by failing to come to a voluntary agreement, were
punished in their pocketbooks by the inequitable results of the rem
edy at law. 226 Thus those statutes requiring the petitioner to prove
that the parties will be "greatly prejudiced" or "greatly inconve
nienced" by partition in kind are requiring proof that partition in
kind will not provide any relief, the cure being more detrimental
than the disease.
Over time, certain factors have emerged as particularly signifi
cant: the economic or fair market value of the land227 and the sub
jective value of the land relative to each of the parties in interest.228
Each owner has an economic interest in the land for its present fair
market value and also in its future appreciation or speculative
value. 229 In addition, each party may have certain subjective inter
ests in the land, such as feelings or sentiments that develop through
222. See 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/17-108 (West 1992) (requiring that the commis
sioners consider the quantity and quality of the land when making allotments between
the parties).
223. Cauthorn V. Cauthorn, 85 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Va. 1955).
224. Hanson V. Willard, 12 Me. 142, 146 (1835).
225. [d.
226. "If they would avoid the difficulty, they ought to agree to buy and sell." [d.
227. "The expression 'interests of the owners,' means pecuniary interest ...."
Johnson V. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 509, 515 (1882). See also Fike V. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252,
1254 (Or. 1977); Sensabaugh V. Sensabaugh, 349 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 1986).
228. Eaton V. Hackett, 352 A.2d 748, 750 (Me. 1976); Schnell V. Schnell, 346
N.W.2d 713, 716 (N.D. 1984).
229. See Willard V. Willard, 145 U.S. 116, 117, 120 (1892); Johnson, 49 Conn. at
509-10 (stating as facts in the record the present value of the defendant's investment, his
receipts from the rental of the property over the preceding twenty-five years and the
increase in value).
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familial relationships, years of ownership or investments of labor. 230
The court can assign an objective monetary value to each party's
share by dividing the fair market value of the property according to
each party's interest. 231 By contrast, it is quite difficult for a court
to quantify each party's subjective value in the land.232 Some courts
have resolved the dilemma by quantifying the sUbjective value in
monetary terms.233 The assumption is that the person who values
the land the most will be willing to pay the most for it. 234 Thus, to
varying degrees, courts in almost every jurisdiction rely on the eco
nomic value of the land to determine whether partition in kind or
partition by sale is the proper remedy.235
230. See, e.g., Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 33 (Conn. 1980) (reversing trial
court's order for sale for failure "to give due consideration to the fact that one of the
tenants in common has been in actual and exclusive possession of a portion of the prop
erty for a substantial period of time; that the tenant has made her home on the prop
erty; and that she derives her livelihood from the operation of a business on this portion
of the property, as her family before her has for many years."); Coxe v. Coxe, 481 A.2d
86,91 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (ordering partition in kind based on "the evidence [which]
clearly established that the property has been owned by the defendant's family since
1924; that the defendant, her husband and her children had exclusive possession of the
property since 1971 and that it served as their home; and that the defendant actively
farmed a portion of the property for the subsistence and livelihood of her family.");
Eaton, 352 A.2d at 752 (indicating that the defendant "wanted to retain part of [the
property] because of her family's historical relation to it."); Whiteley v. Whiteley, 84 A.
68,70 (Md. 1912) (noting that the appellee's "desire for the property was a sentimental
one, because it had been his father's home ..."); Schnell, 346 N.W.2d 713, 721 (N.D.
1984) (acknowledging defendant's "right to preserve the heritage of her labors, and the
right to pass the property to her heirs. ").
231. Gaer Bros., Inc. v. Mott, 161 A.2d 782, 784 (Conn. 1960); 59A AM. JUR. 20
Partition § 1 (1987) (citing Michael v. Sphier, 272 P. 902, 902 (Or. 1928».
232. Eaton, 352 A.2d at 750 (determining that "a particular portion of a parcel of
land might have a greater desirability to one party than to the other, for either financial,
utilitarian or sentimental advantages."); Kluthe v. Hammerquist, 188 N.W. 749, 749
(S.D. 1922) (indicating that "two heirs ha[ve] a special interest in this tract of land aside
from its ordinary sale value, and might become competitive bidders at a partition
sale."). See also Craig-Taylor, supra note 61, at 768-69 (contending that "[a]n approach
which focuses on economic efficiency may produce a more quantifiable, but not neces
sarily more equitable, result.").
233. "The economic valuation process reflects a hierarchy where market activity
is implicitly privileged, and psychological and emotional components are undervalued."
Craig-Taylor, supra note 61, at 769. See also Eaton, 352 A.2d at 750 (stating that, "in a
particular case an attempt to place a precise monetary value on the property may not be
helpful or essential to an equal division. Value ... means the full range of the benefit
the parties may be expected to derive from their ownership of their respective shares.").
234. "The values of co-owners who do not share these assumptions about value
are marginalized. Their claims are deemed less worthy due to their failure to communi
cate their value in financial terms." Craig-Taylor, supra note 61, at 769.
235. Rutherford v. Jones, 14 Ga. 521 (1854), available at 1854 WL 1494, at *2;
Rothert v. Rothert, 441 N.E.2d 179, 183 (III. 1982); Hill v. Reno, 112 Ill. 154, 162-63
(1883); Welch v. Zucco, 665 So. 2d 697,699 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Tri-State Concrete Co.
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There are two different formulations of the dominant test used
by the courts to ascertain whether the interests of all of the parties
will be promoted by a sale, or inversely stated, whether partition in
kind will "prejudice" or "inconvenience" the parties. One asks
"whether the aggregate value of the several parcels into which the
whole premises must be divided will, when distributed among the
different parties and held in severalty, be materially less than the
value of the same property if it be owned by one person;"236 the
second, in more simplified terms, queries "whether the value of the
share of each in case of partition [in kind] would be materially less
than his share of the money equivalent that could probably be ob
tained for the whole."237 Some states continue to acknowledge that
land has subjective value to the parties in interest, and, although
not easily quantified, that these subjective factors should be given
some consideration.
This balancing act between the objective economic value and
the subjective value of the land is an expression of the concurrent
jurisdiction of law and equity in partition. Without America's long
history favoring partition in kind, the remedy of sale would domi
nate partition as it does in England.238 This is because it is more
economically efficient for the parties and the courts to order a sale
rather than wrangle with the specific facts and equities of each
case. 239 Once the court has determined each party's share in the
land and the fair market value, the land is sold at public or private
auction and the proceeds are divided proportionally.240 The entire
proceeding occurs objectively and as a matter of law.
v. Stephens, 395 So. 2d 894, 897 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Williams v. Coombs, 33 A. 1073,
1074 (Me. 1895); Whiteley v. Whiteley, 84 A. 68, 69 (Md. Ct. App. 1912); Phillips v.
Phillips, 104 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Neb. 1960); Trowbridge v. Donner, 40 N.W.2d 655, 660
(Neb. 1950); Schnell v. Schnell, 346 N.W.2d 713, 716 (N.D. 1984).
236. Blanchard v. Cross, 123 A. 382, 384 (Vt. 1924); Croston v. Male, 49 S.E. 136,
139 (W. Va. 1904). But see Leake v. Casati, 363 S.E.2d 924, 927 (Va. 1988), quoting
Sensabaugh v. Sensabaugh, 349 S.E. 141,145-46 (Va. 1986) (deciding that "[e]ven evi
dence that the property would be less valuable if divided was held 'insufficient to de
prive a co-owner of his sacred right to property' ").
237. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d at 56; Trowbridge, 40 N.W.2d at 660; Leavitt v. Benzing,
82 A.2d 86, 87 (N.H. 1951), Fike v. Sharer, 57 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Or. 1977); Haggerty v.
Nobles, 419 P.2d 9, 12 (Or. 1966); Johnson v. Hendrickson, 24 N.W.2d 914, 916 (S.D.
1946); Kluthe v. Hammerquist, 188 N.W. 749, 750 (S.D. 1922); Blanchard, 123 A. at 384;
Idema v. Comstock, 110 N.W. 786,787 (Wis. 1907).
238. See supra Part III.B. (discussing the status of partition by sale in England as
compared to the United States).
239. But see Craig-Taylor, supra note 61, at 765-66.
240. 59A AM. JUR. 2D § 1(1987); 68 c.J.S. Partition § 2 (1988); 7 POWELL, supra
note 94, § 50.07[1], at 50-37.
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THE INHERENT CONFLICT AND RESOLVING THE TENSION

Co-tenancy contradicts one of the basic tenets of Anglo-Amer
ican property law-that each owner has the right to possess, use
and enjoy his land as he sees fit-by allowing multiple parties all of
whom are possessed of the same rights to exercise those rights over
one shared parcel of land. 241 Clearly, the actions of one party will
infringe upon those of another and each will be constrained in his
use of the land by the actions of the other co-tenants.242 Partition
solves this dilemma by severing the co-tenancy relationship. Thus
the action for partition itself is remedial because it provides an al
ternative arrangement for co-tenants who can no longer agree on
the best use of the commonly held land. The right to partition was
established as absolute and available to all co-tenants regardless of
their interest in the land. 243 The right to partition is a necessary
extension of the fundamental rights of possession, use and enjoy
ment in the context of common ownershi p244 and to force co-te
nants to maintain that relationship would be to deny them the
ability to exercise those rights freely. However, since neither party
has superior title, both being possessed of the same rights, "[t]he
only question is how can it [partition] best be made?"245 Where the
court is restricted, as it is in Connecticut,246 to only two forms of
relief, the requesting party's "undeniable right to severalty in own
ership shall be secured by the least injurious of the two specified
modes. "247

A.

Origins of the Remedy of Sale

The exact origins of partition by sale are unclear. 248 However,
the connections between payment of owelty and partition by sale
cannot be ignored. Payment of owelty held, and continues to hold,
an unusual position within the spectrum of available remedies.
241. 7 POWELL, supra note 94, § 50.07[1], at 50-14.
242. "Each co-tenant has the right to use and enjoy the entire property as if he or
she were the sole owner, limited only by the same right in the other co-tenants." 7
POWELL supra note 94, § 50.07[1], at 50-37.
243. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. See also 7 POWELL, supra
note 94, § 50.07[3][a], at 50-41.
244. 7 POWELL, supra note 94, § 50.07[1], at 50-37 & § 50.07[3][a], at 50-41.
245. Richardson v. Monson, 23 Conn. 94, 96 (1854).
246. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500. See supra note 7 (transcribing verbatim section
52-500 (a». Cf Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 761 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Conn. 2000).
247. Johnson v. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 509, 518 (1882).
248. Loyd, supra note 1, at 175 (indicating that the Partition Act of 1868 came
from "the era of law reform.").
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Owelty was first used by courts of chancery to equalize actual divi
sions between coparceners. 249 Following the enactment of the Act
of Henry VIII in 1539,250 owelty was used concurrently with parti
tion in kind as a remedy available to all co-tenants.251 As part of
the English common law, it was incorporated into statutes252 and
American common law.253 Owelty was used by some early
courts254 to diminish the inequities of partition in kind where the
court was not authorized to order a sale. In the twentieth century,
courts have used partition with payment of owelty in a modified
form.255
Statutes authorizing partition by sale act upon the right of any
co-tenant to demand partition to remedy the evils of land rendered
unmarketable and unproductive by common ownership.256 These
statutes authorizing partition by sale are "purely remedial law[ s],
acting upon existing rights, and providing a remedy for existing
evils ...."257 Although the right to demand partition was held to
be absolute,258 American courts were willing to dismiss petitions for
partition by sale where a superior claim in equity was presented. 259
Thus the remedy of sale was grounded firmly in equity and would
yield only to other equitable considerations.
249. See discussion supra Part III.A-B. & III.B. (discussing origins of owelty).
250. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1539) (Eng.).
251. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1539) (Eng.). See also 7 POWELL, supra note 94, § 50.09, at
50-54.
252. Wilson v. European & Am. R.R. Co., 62 Me. 112, 112 (1873), available at
1873 WL 3171, at *1 (noting that ME. REV. STAT., c. 88, § 17 stated that "when any
parcel of the estate to be divided is of greater value than either party's share, and can
not be divided without great inconvenience, it may be assigned to one party by his
paying the sum of money awarded to the parties who have less than their share.");
Codman v. Tinkham, 32 Mass. 364, 365-66 (1834) (citing statute of 1783, c. 41 § 2 al
lowing for owelty upon a petition for partition in order to equalize the shares, but hold
ing that the statute does not authorize a court to set the entire parcel off to one party).
253. See infra note 280 and accompanying text (discussing the retention of owelty
in Connecticut common law).
254. Wilson, 62 Me. at 113, available at 1873 WL 3171, at *1 (ordering partition
by sale rather than owelty concluding "that one part owner of real estate cannot be
compelled against his will to take more than his share of the estate, and to pay for the
excess to the other part owners who have less than their share. He may do so, if he is
willing; but the law will not compel him to do so against his will.").
255. Reitmeier v. Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565 (D. N.J. 1986) (allowing one party
to retain full title and possession of the property with full monetary compensation paid
to the other party, i.e. a private sale restricted to the co-tenants).
256. 7 POWELL, supra note 94, § 50.07[3][a], at 50-41.
257. Id.
258. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (establishing the right to parti
tion as absolute).
259. Hayden v. Denslow, 27 Conn. 335, 341-43 (1858).
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The Validity of the Remedy of Sale

The validity of the statutes authorizing courts to order the judi
cial sale of land held in common was challenged in England and in
America. 260 Statutes in the United States authorizing partition by
sale were not enacted until after the ratification of the Constitu
tion. 261 The federal Constitution authorized states to regulate prop
erty and property rights provided such laws were consistent with
the protection provided property owners against governmental in
terference under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The ac
tual scope and definition of those rights were determined by state
constitutions. A few cases raised constitutional claims. 262 In Rich
ardson v. Monson, the plaintiff attempted to characterize the order
of a sale as a governmental taking without the public purpose justi
fication under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 263 Courts re
jected these claims and attempted to establish that the common law
tradition of partition and the principles of equity, either inherent to
an action for partition or within the jurisdiction of the court, au
thorized courts to order partition by sale.
C.

Balancing the Remedies and the Rights

The ownership of land is the penultimate right in the Anglo
American legal tradition, a right of more ancient origin than the
right to partition. Partition by its very nature both contradicts and
confirms the fundamental principles of property ownership. The
right of each co-tenant to use and enjoy the property is confirmed
by the absolute nature of the right to partition. Yet the very act of
effectuating that partition, regardless of the remedy, alters each
owner's relationship to the land without his consent and despite any
objections. Whereas partition in kind allows each co-tenant to
maintain his or her ownership relationship with respect to a specific
share of the land, partition by sale severs all relationships, legal and
equitable, between the co-tenants and the land. 264 Partition in kind
260. See Johnson v. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 509,518 (1882); Richardson v. Monson, 23
Conn. 94, 97-98 (1854); Murphy v. Murphy, 175 N.E. 378, 379 (Ill. 1931) (summarily
dismissing defendant's claim that he had "been deprived of his property without due
process of law").
261. "A similar statute has existed and been regarded as constitutional, in the
state of New York, since the year 1811." Richardson, 23 Conn. at 96.
262. See Murphy, 175 N.E. at 379 (summarily dismissing defendant's claim that
he had "been deprived of his property without due process of law").
263. Richardson, 23 Conn. at 97.
264. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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provides a remedy by allowing each party to own a portion of the
land in severalty without destroying his or her relationship to the
land. Payment of owelty maintains the relationship because each
party still receives a portion of the land, but one party is compen
sated with money for the lesser share received. Partition by sale,
however, destroys the relationship of all the co-tenants to the land
such that no one can use or enjoy the property as they are all
divested of their ownership rights. Thus, the remedy of sale is an
extreme exercise of judicial authority. Early courts recognized this
and attempted to root the remedy of sale in the recognized legal
principles of equity and property rights in order to justify its use.
Courts argued that the right to partition had been incorporated
into the law of property as an incident of ownership in common. 265
"[T]bis right of partition enters into the very nature of the title of
estates holden in common and is inseparable from them. "266 "The
right of partition is incident to all real estate holden in common ...
and especially whenever it can not be otherwise enjoyed. The right
of beneficial enjoyment ... is as essential as the right of owner
ship."267 Therefore, any person owning land in common was sub
ject to this right and to the remedies necessary to give it effect.
However, where sale deprives a party of ownership and possession
in order to give partition effect, partition in kind and payment of
owelty allows the interested parties to maintain ownership of a por
tion of the land, while compensating them monetarily for any minor
inequities.
The action of partitioning land. is, by its very nature, remedial.
It provides a means of dissolving a co-tenancy that is restricting or
preventing the parties in interest from exercising their rights of
ownership. The corresponding remedies, therefore, must also be
remedial; they must allow one party to recover for his or her loss or
injury. Partition by sale is the more extreme remedy; therefore, the
restrictive preference for partition in kind imposes a legitimate
check on the balancing of private property interests and the public
interest in alienable land. Private sales, due to their similarity to
partition in kind accomplish the remedial purpose of partition while
maintaining a proper balance between the parties' interests such
that any party who has not consented to the sale need not be de
265. Wood v. Little, 35 Me. 107, 110 (1853) (noting that "[i]t is believed ... that
this right of partition is incident to the real estate held in joint tenancy or tenancy in
common").
266. Richardson, 23 Conn. at 97.
267. [d.
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prived of his land against his will. He may participate in the private
sale and the extent to which he values the land will be demon
strated by the amount he is willing to pay. In this manner subjec
tive values may be represented in the sale, albeit in monetary terms.
VI.

RESOLUTIONS AND REMEDIES IN GIULIETTI

Despite early Connecticut case law demonstrating adherence
to the preference for partition in kind,268 partition by sale became a
common remedy.269 Trial courts in particular found partition by
sale more convenient because it tended to provide a final resolu
tion.270 In 1980, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court re-af
firmed its commitment to partition in kind through its decision in
Delfino v. Vealends,271 reversing a superior court's decision order
ing a partition by sale. 272 The court ordered the land divided in
kind despite unique characteristics that made an equitable division
difficult, if not impossible. 273 The supreme court found the facts of
the case determinative of the issue based on its own finding that
neither of the two statutory grounds for sale, that partition in kind
is either impracticable or inequitable or that a sale would better
promote the interests of the parties,274 were present. 275 The defen
dant inherited the land from her parents; she lived on the parcel
and ran a business, her sole means of support, from that same piece
of land. 276 These facts contradicted any finding that it was "in the
best interest" of the owners to order partition by sale because a sale
268. Johnson v. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 509, 517 (1882); Kelley v. Madden, 40 Conn.
274, 280 (1873); Scovil v. Kennedy, 14 Conn. 349, 353 (1841).
269. Gaer Bros., Inc. v. Mott, 161 A.2d 782, 785 (Conn. 1960); Candee v. Candee,
86 A. 758, 759-60 (Conn. 1913); Johnson, 49 Conn. at 518-19; Richardson, 23 Conn. at
98.
270. Baucells & Lippman, supra note 184, at 1234 (reiterating the opinion of Max
Reicher, the retired superior court judge who was appointed judge trial referee on re
mand for Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980».
271. Delfino, 436 A.2d at 27.
272. Id. at 33.
273. [d. at 31 (discussing the trial court's finding that, "due to the situation and
location of the parcel of land, the size and area of the property, the physical structure
and appurtenances on the property, and other factors [primarily zoning issues], a physi
cal partition of the property would not be feasible.")
274. [d. at 30.
275. Id. at 33 (stating that "[t]he trial court failed to give due consideration to the
fact that one of the tenants in common has been in actual and exclusive possession of a
portion of the property for a substantial period of time; that the tenant has made her
home on the property; and that she derives her livelihood from the operation of a busi
ness on this portion of the property, as her family before her has for many years.").
276. Id.
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would have deprived her of her inheritance, her house, and her bus
iness. Although the defendant was allowed to maintain possession
of her house and business, on remand, she was required to pay
owelty to compensate the plaintiff for the value of the land she re
tained in excess of her interest.277 Because partition in kind is often
difficult to accomplish equitably, owelty can be used to adjust each
party's share according to his or her legal interest or actual owner
ship of the property. A review of Connecticut partition cases
reveals that Connecticut has retained use of owelty to make equita
ble adjustments in partition actions. 278 It is only by virtue of the
retained power to order owelty that the Connecticut courts can up
hold the preference for partition in kind and yet also provide an
equitable remedy.
The decision in Delfino v. Vealencis 279 is important for two rea
sons. It has forced trial courts to scrutinize carefully the facts of
each case to determine whether the party requesting a sale has sat
isfied both elements that partition in kind is impracticable or ineq
uitable and that partition by sale would better promote the interests
of the owners. It also demonstrates a willingness on the part of
Connecticut's highest court to use its equitable powers in conjunc
tion with the historical principles underlying partition to strike a
balance between the right of a co-tenant to sever his interest in the
property and the court's obligation to uphold the fundamental ten
ets of property ownership.
In Fernandes v. Rodriguez ,280 the Connecticut Supreme Court
reversed and remanded a decision by the appellate court ordering
the defendant to transfer his interest in the joint property to the
plaintiff in exchange for a payment of owelty by the plaintiff. 281
277. Baucells & Lippman, supra note 184, at 1234-35.
278. Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 761 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Conn. 2000) (holding that a
court may "award money damages if an order of partition in kind results in minor ineq
uities" (citing 7 POWELL, supra note 94, § 50.Q7 (3)(a), (4) & (5))); Johnson v. Olmsted,
49 Conn. 509, 519 (1882) (noting that "as the money is to stand for the land, the court
can make all necessary orders for the protection of his rights ..."); Kelley v. Madden,
40 Conn. 274, 280 (1873) (ordering partition in kind based on accounting rather than
strictly on parties' legal title); Scovil v. Kennedy, 14 Conn. 349, 354 (1841) (asserting
that "the powers of the court are adequate to a full and just compensatory adjust
ment"); Filipetti v. Filipetti, 479 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that
"[t]he court has the power and authority to order such payments to facilitate an equita
ble and fair division" (citing 4A POWELL, supra note 94, § 612; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 98, § 6.26».
279. Delfino, 436 A.2d at 27 (Conn. 1980).
280. 761 A.2d 1283 (Conn. 2000).
281. Id. at 1286 n.4.
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The supreme court held that a trial court may award damages to
adjust an inequitable division in kind; however, a court may not
order one party to transfer title to another. 282 Thus, a trial court in
an action for partition may not deprive one party of his interest in
the property by ordering one party to sell his interest to the
other. 283 Generally, a court may require only such payments where
both parties have retained an interest in the land.284 Although this
demarcation appears to be a distinction without a difference, it
reveals the Connecticut Supreme Court's adherence to the well-de
veloped body of law pertaining to partition actions. 285 The court, in
Fernandes, carefully noted that the statute allowing for partition in
kind dates back to 1720, and the statute authorizing partition by
sale similarly dates back to 1844 with minimal changes in the lan
guage of either. 286
On the basis of the history of the right to partition, and in light of
the legislative treatment of that right, we have held repeatedly
that in resolving partition actions, the only two modes of relief
within the power of the court are partition by division of real
estate and partition by sale. 287

Neither the language of the statute nor the powers of equity
inherent in an action for partition permit a trial court to "sub
stitut[e] its own ideas of what might be a wise provision in place of a
clear expression of legislative Will."288 "[A]lthough the trial court is
responsible for promoting the best interests of the parties, that con
sideration does not afford the trial court with latitude beyond the
two modes of partition provided by the legislature. "289 Thus, in
Fernandes, the Connecticut Supreme Court curtailed any attempts
to expand the limited remedies available in a partition action and
by doing so restricted the lower court's authority to exercise its eq
uitable powers in fashioning a remedy in an action for partition.
Following the decision in Fernandes, the superior court's equi
282. Id. at 1286.
283. Id. at 1287-88.
284. See Reitmeier v. Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565, 577-78 (D. N.J. 1986) (citing 68
C.l.S. Partition § 142 (1985)).
285. Fernandes, 761 A.2d at 1289 (stating that the "decision in the present case is
governed by statutes ... that have been construed previously by this court in light of
their history, language and apparent purpose").
286. Id. at 1288-89 (noting that the "decision in the present case is governed by
statutes that have been 'on the books' for a very long time ...").
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1289.
289. Id.
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table powers in fashioning a remedy in furtherance of the "best in
terests of the parties" were circumscribed by the "clear expression
of legislative will"290 contained in section 52-500 of the Connecticut
General Statutes and the long history of cases allowing for only two
modes of relief. 291 There is no provision in section 52-500 authoriz
ing superior courts to order partition by private sale whereas sec
tion 45a-164 permits probate courts to order a public or private sale
in their discretion. 292 The specificity of the language in section 45a
164 precludes the presumption that the term "sale" in section 52
500 includes both public and private sales. However, unlike the
seemingly improvised remedy in Fernandes ,293 the decision in Giu
lietti does not involve the substitution or creation of a remedy; in
stead, a court of superior jurisdiction used a parallel statute to reach
a result consistent with that of the court which had primary subject
matter jurisdiction. 294 Although it appears that the decision in Giu
lietti expands the remedies available in partition actions and
thereby expands the authority of the court to exercise its equitable
powers in providing a remedy, the superior court's use of probate
statute section 45a-164 is based entirely on the facts presented. By
grounding the Giulietti 295 decision in the facts, the appellate court
maintained the preference for partition in kind, recently revived in
Delfino,296 and avoided affirming a decision that would directly
contradict the narrow statutory construction and limiting judicial
history forcefully reiterated in Fernandes .297
The decision in Giulietti v. Giulietti 298 attempts to reconcile the
holdings in Delfino and Fernandes as applied to the unique facts
and circumstances presented. Following the Delfino approach, the
appellate court focused on the facts of the case in order to deter
mine what was in the best interests of the parties. 299 Although a
substantial body of authority existed granting the superior court the
authority to use the broad equitable powers inherent in action for
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1287.
292. See supra notes 7, 54 (containing the language of Connecticut General Stat
utes sections 52-500(a) and 45a-164(a), respectively).
293. Id. at 1289 (holding that the remedy provided by the trial court and affirmed
by the appellate court was not "legally permissible").
294. See supra notes 7, 53, & 54 (containing Connecticut General Statutes sec
tions 52-500(a), 45a-166(a) and 45a-164(a), respectively).
295. 784 A.2d 905 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
296. 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980).
297. 761 A.2d at 1283.
298. 784 A.2d at 905.
299. Id. at 936-37.
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partition, the court refused to expand its powers and the remedies
available to it beyond the scope of the legislative mandate con
tained in section 52-500. 300 It is precisely this inherent power of
equity in an action for partition that forces the appellate court to
ground its decision in the unusual facts presented and the historical
preference for partition in kind. Without these parameters, supe
rior courts would be free to exercise that inherent power to mold an
equitable remedy thereby diminishing the value of precedent in ac
tions for partition, disrupting all efforts to achieve consistent results
for similar cases and threatening the stability that both maintain
with respect to property ownership and property rights.
CONCLUSION

Neither the superior court decision nor the appellate court de
cision highlights the absence of specific statutory authority to order
a private sale. Both opinions delve into statutory construction, leg
islative history, and precedent under Connecticut General Statutes
section 52-500 and then move almost seamlessly into the corre
sponding probate statute, section 45a-164, relying on the unusual
facts in Giulietti to provide the rationale. This careful construction
emphasizes the recent developments of the action of partition in
Connecticut law following the decision in Delfino. The re-affirma
tion of the preference for partition in kind in Connecticut law
stands in marked contrast to the evolution of partition actions in
the United States. As discussed in sections IV and VI, partition by
sale never became the preferred remedy but has been used with
increasing frequency due to concerns over efficiency, land valua
tion, and equal distribution. Although the Giulietti decision main
tains that preference for partition in kind without resorting to an
impermissible extension of remedies as in Fernandes, the decision
does not clarify the current status of partition or the exact remedies
available in Connecticut.
The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Delfino altered
the course of partition actions in Connecticut by reinstating the le
gal presumption favoring partition in kind. Just as the decision in
Fernandes limited the scope of the decision in Delfino by prevent
ing a superior court from ordering the transfer of title as a payment
of owelty, so too does the decision in Giulietti. The preference for
partition in kind must yield to the interests of equity, which de
manded that Attorney Giulietti be deprived of his share in the fam
300.

CONN. GEN. STAT.

§S2-500. See supra note 7.
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ily land. Thus it is clear that while the preference for partition in
kind expresses a valued tenet of public policy, equity is a fundamen
tal principle of partition in Connecticut jurisprudence. Given that
the decision in Giulietti relies heavily on the facts, it seems highly
unlikely that superior courts will be able to order private sales in
actions for partition unless remarkably similar facts dictate a similar
result. Thus, Giulietti provides minimal precedential value in terms
of expanding or redefining the available remedies. It does, how
ever, reinforce the role of equity inherent in all partition actions in
the same manner that Delfino re-affirmed the codified preference
for partition in kind.
The Connecticut appellate courts, in Delfino, Fernandes, and
Giulietti have maintained the more traditional interpretation of par
tition and restricted the remedies to partition in kind, owelty, and
partition by sale. The law on partition in Connecticut is merely
framed by these watershed cases; it is the accumulation of cases at
the trial level that provides the substantive precedents and to which
most practitioners will turn in pursuing an action for partition.
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